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 This thesis explores the role of the horse as used by the German Army throughout the 
Second World War. Contrary to the propagandic image of a mechanized Germany and of the 
blitzkrieg, the reality of warfare at the time remained primarily dependent on the horse, as man 
and beast continued to engage in conflict side by side. Horses served a variety of uses within the 
German forces, from mounted cavalry to hauling artillery, with disasters and successes 
throughout the war. Employing vast numbers of horses, the Germans allocated extensive 
resources, and often found themselves relying on the animal when vehicles losses were high. The 
scope of this work includes a discussion on war strategy, select campaigns in which the horse 
played a pivotal role, the history of cavalry within Germany, and training of cavalrymen and 
their horses. It is important to understand the role of the horse within the scope and context of the 
German Army during World War II, in order to fully analyze and comprehend the German 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A quick nudge of the heel and the horse leapt into a gallop – for a brief moment the horse 
pulled against the bit in his mouth towards freedom and the soldier felt the power beneath him; 
the same power Napoleon and Alexander felt as they charged into battle. Suddenly, the ground 
seemed to erupt as a shell buried itself into the dark earth and sent horse and rider into a frenzied 
state, racing towards an inevitable barrier, not of horseflesh but rather of steel and iron. Flashes 
of metal – bullets, not swords – whizzed past the pinned ears of the horse and the helmeted head 
of the German cavalryman as they dashed into the fray of war and strife. Yet this was not the 
first time war horses met war machines on the battlefield; indeed, the frantic meeting of cold 
steel to equine muscle had occurred across the map, on local to global stages, with disastrous 
consequences. 
Still ensuing after the lessons of the First World War, the warhorse was destined to 
continue its ride with the German Army during World War II. Historically met by other horses 
and swords, the twentieth century cavalry horse would now be met by machine guns, tanks, 
airplanes, and motor vehicles. A great misunderstanding of World War II is that of the 
mechanized and advanced German Army. While the German Army possessed motorized 
vehicles and an impressive tank strategy, the majority of her forces relied on horse-drawn 
transport and supply. So much so has this image influenced how the past is told, that the 
hoofprints of millions of horses have almost faded from the pages of history. The image of the 
German blitzkrieg, aimed to strike fear and terror in the minds and hearts of Germany’s enemies, 
was in reality only a portion of the military force and masked a largely under-motorized army.  
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The role of the horse as it was used by the German Army during the Second World War, 
while being inspected to an extent compliant with available resources, has not been adequately 
dispersed nor their significance fully explained within the context of World War II as a whole. 
While the end of the cavalry was a subsequent consequence of a modernizing world, the horse’s 
role as a dependable and relentless ‘soldier’ persisted during modern conflict, and therefore 
deserves to be understood within the context of the Second World War in which they were so 
numerously deployed and recognized for their contribution and impact. Even as war modernized, 
horses retained a, albeit decreasing, role in support and transportation. 
Further, to remember the warhorse and to understand their plight, is akin to remembering 
the soldier who gave his life on the battlefield and the extended impact of war on the land and 
animals; it is not only essential to understanding our past, but in the understanding of how far we 
have come as humankind, from bareback charges across open fields to armored calvary retaining 
the name as an ode to their origins. Horses are flight animals who learned to trust man even after 
man hunted them and became the mode for many battles and empires to be established.1 In 
battle, they were urged forward only by trust in the rider upon their backs, giving man the gifts of 
speed, height, strength, intimidation, and companionship. 
As a testament to the warhorse, but also in an effort to understand the full comprehensive 
nature of the German Army operating during World War II, it is necessary to explore the large 
role the horse played during the war. This thesis seeks to understand and analyze the use of 
horses and cavalry by the German Army during the Second World War in the context of 
mechanizing warfare.  
 
 
1 For further information see Wendy Williams’ book The Horse: The Epic History of Our Noble Companion. New 
York, NY: Scientific America, 2015. 
 McFarland 6 
THE GERMAN CAVALRY AND THE INTERWAR YEARS 
 
“A thousand years or more of cavalry achievements and tradition were being consigned 
to the dustbin of history” according to Peter Hart who wrote of the impact of mechanized warfare 
in his book The Somme: The Darkest Hour on the Western Front. 2 Hart was describing the 
Battle of Flers-Courcelette in the First World War and the inevitable realization that horses were 
no match for the beasts of steel that opposed them on the battlefield. Indeed, many western 
nations took their cavalry and either armored them or relayed them to be ceremonial following 
the Great War. If these nations retained cavalry into the Second World War, they eventually 
were phased out. These nations included Poland, Belgium, and Russia, among others.  
The broader matter of cavalry becoming obsolete in the face of metal and technology was 
an inevitable truth of modern warfare. However, the prevalence and continuation of the use of 
the horse within the German Army in the Second World War and furthermore into the twentieth 
century, was in part due to engrained tradition and regulatory circumstance following the First 
World War. This positioning, and the undeniable mobility advantages of the horse placed the 
animal to retain a prominent role in the German Army. 
 
The German Cavalry 
The cavalry3 was an essential military component in armies once man understood how to 
harness the power of the horse and utilize that power on the battlefield. A man on a horse is not 
only bigger, but faster and more terrifying than a man on foot. Although the horse presented a 
 
2 Hart, Peter. The Somme: The Darkest Hour on the Western Front (New York, NY: Pegasus Books, 2010), 407 
3 Appendix: Image 15 
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larger target, and stopping the horse would stop the man, larger horses carried more weight and 
thus more equipment. An impressive figure, a man on horse could not only ram into his enemies 
but could leap over obstacles and utilize his horse’s hooves to inflict damage along with his 
weapons.  
Cavalry has its roots in the ancient civilizations such as the Sumerians in Mesopotamia 
and the Egyptians, whose warriors used horses to pull war chariots. The Persians rode against the 
Greek infantry in 4th century BC, without armor or stirrups. Elite, aristocratic horsemen were 
enlisted into the Macedonian cavalry, a heavily armored and impressive force.4 European cavalry 
is thought to be dated to the fifth century BC, and it continued to be a prominent component of 
European militaries up until the late 1800s.5 The Franco-Prussian War can be considered the last 
continuous cavalry dependent conflict, where the operations were cavalry-on-cavalry.6 By the 
end of the nineteenth century and into World War I, western nations still fielded cavalry units 
and divisions, but they adapted to newer technologies and transitioned to fighting on foot, the 
United States cavalry during the civil war being a prime example.7 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the romanticism of the cavalry was dying out, as 
military leaders began to consult the effectiveness of the cavalry as it related to working against 
and with infantry. As weapon technology advanced, as did warfare, horses were utilized more as 
transport than as weapons of war. The mentality of the cavalry soldier also changed; by 
transitioning to fighting on foot, the soldier “did not feel morally obligated…to die on 
horseback.”8 
 
4 Parker, Geoffrey. The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008.) 
pages 12-34 
5 Dorondo, D. R. Riders of the Apocalypse: German Cavalry and Modern Warfare, 1870-1945. (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2012.) p4 
6 Ibid, page 16 
7 Ibid, 18 
8 Ibid, 18 
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The shock of a charging horse historically would send men to hit the ground, both to 
evade sabers and to make an obstacle for the horse to avoid.9 However, war tactics changed as 
infantrymen grew accustomed to confronting cavalry. As firearm technology advanced, an 
infantryman not only could confront the cavalry from a distance, but also target the horse better, 
as to stop the horse would mean stopping the cavalry altogether as man and beast fell. 
Infantrymen armed with arquebuses and protected by pikemen were standard opponents to 
cavalry, until the invention of socket bayonets enabled soldiers to simultaneously reload and 
continue on the defense.10 During the Franco-Prussian War, German infantry simply stood in 
lines and shot at charging cavalry. In this way, the opposing French cavalry suffered heavy 
losses and infantry gained an advantage over the mounted warrior. The war also highlighted the 
substantial advantage mounted soldiers had in reconnaissance work.11 
The strength of the calvary remained in their specific power of the charge and the shock 
value of hundreds, if not thousands, of horsemen charging upon their enemies. Horsemen 
remained effective in reconnaissance12 and, in some cases, pursuing a fleeing army. Removed 
from the battlefield, the cavalry retained a certain romanticism, whether in uniforms adorned in 
gold or horsehair plumes atop a shiny helmet.13 Reconnaissance and screening remained an 
integral purpose of the cavalry but compared to the American cavalrymen of the Civil War, 
German cavalry was slow to adapt to the modern era. As Union and Confederate soldiers were 
essentially light dragoons, or mounted infantrymen, the Germans continued to specialize their 
cavalry until 1870. Light cavalry, while best suited to reconnaissance, security, and screening, 
 
9 Ibid, p20 
10 Ibid, p7 
11 Ibid, p21 
12 Appendix: Image 5 
13 Ibid, pages 16-17 
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still differed greatly from heavy armored cavalry, equipped for battle. American cavalrymen 
were trained to fight mounted or dismounted, and yet still were trained for reconnaissance and 
messenger services.14  
This is not to say that cavalry was always successful in pursuit or reconnaissance. The 
Prussian cavalry at Königgrätz in July 1866 failed to provide effective reconnaissance before the 
battle and then did not carry out an effective pursuit of the fleeing Austrians. Regardless, 
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Prussia’s leading commander, still maintained the cavalry could 
work effectively alongside artillery and infantry. The French army, during the Franco-Prussian 
War, apart from not having adequate horse reserves, had failed to understand the size and power 
of the German Army. Consequently, the French cavalry, who did not change tactics and rode 
through fields lined with fences and grape vines, were met with heavy rifle fire as they 
approached Froeschwiller, Worth, and Morsbronn.15 
German cavalry continued to prove worthwhile in the war against the French, as they 
maintained intelligence reports and fixing the enemy until infantry arrived. German scouts would 
go as far as forty miles ahead of the main columns of infantry. In August 1870, cavalrymen were 
successful in destroying French railroads and cutting telegraphs. Apart from psychological 
victories as the Germans pushed the French deeper into Francophone country, the Prussians were 
successful in a straight to gallop charge (typically the gallop was developed after some trot and 
canter) and successfully attacked the French gun-line at Mars-la-Tour, allowing infantrymen and 
artillery to regroup.16 The charges at Mars-la-Tour, for there would be a second charge later on 
 
14 Ibid, p18. Further, see Appendix: Image 14 
15 Ibid, p20-21 
16 Ibid, p24 
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August 16, are described as the last truly successful charges in Western European warfare, 
executed under General von Bredow.17 
The classic charge, however, was becoming obsolete, as many of the charges in the 
Franco-Prussian War served as a means to give infantry time. Putting aside tactical and 
organizational shortcomings, as there will always be arguments to the effectiveness of the use of 
the cavalry in the late nineteenth century, the inescapable reality was to be that firearms and 
sheer artillery progression was diminishing the role of the cavalry on the battlefield. However, 
the German cavalry, employing tactics from Napoleon 1, were able to temporarily elude this 
notion, as approaching cavalry at a gallop could avoid heavy losses from canon-fire and thus 
appear effective and more powerful on the battlefield.18 
By the outbreak of the First World War, the need for the horse on the battlefield was 
being called into question, as coordinated infantrymen replaced the charge, vehicles worked 
alongside horses as transportation, and firearms were greatly improved in terms of range and 
accuracy. On top of the interdiction between beast and steel, a growing European population 
meant an increase in infrastructure and urbanization across the continent. Fences, walls, mine-
pits, railways, and soft footing were some of the consequences of this population growth, and all 
contributed to a hinderance of mounted troop movement.19 
The Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War of the period hinted towards the modernizing 
role of the cavalry; that of mounted infantry. The greatest weapon in the cavalry’s toolkit did 
remain the charge, which was sacrificed when soldiers dismounted to rely on firepower.  
 
17 Ibid, p25 
18 Ibid, p28 
19 Ibid, p40 
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German cavalry rode to battle in the First World War, but trenches cut through the 
European country, artillery fire created gridlock, and the front lines grew static, creating a 
curtailed role for the cavalry.20 By October of 1914, German cavalry on the Western Front began 
transitioning to infantrymen, although evidently most of the grounded cavalrymen refused to 
remove their spurs.21 On the Eastern Front, cavalry proved  invaluable against the Russians, 
messing with lines of communication and overall logistics, as well as effectively screening and 
reconnoitering.22 
The Battle of the Somme, an iconic and essential battle for Allied victory in the Great 
War, was a quintessential exhibition of the meeting of cavalry and modern warfare. The Somme, 
for many nations, sealed the fate of the cavalry and delegated mounted units to their modern-day 
roles. Trench warfare, advanced guns and ammunition, aerial attacks, and chemical gas were 
only a few of the new horrors that faced the cavalry. In the end, the cavalry, as fast as they could 
charge, could not outrun the inevitable fate of becoming irrelevant in the face of rapidly 
advancing warfare and unspeakable terrors.23 
By the end of the Franco-Prussian war, the German cavalry had adapted to include 
traditional instruction of saber and lance, but also that of firearms. In this way the German 
cavalry was still relevant to the military, and because of this adaptability, would continue to exist 
while other nations transitioned to ceremonial cavalries or motorized divisions. German cavalry 
had expanded to include horse-drawn artillery and a truck column and while they were not as 
strong as the infantry, they were certainly stronger than their counterparts.24 
 
20 Ibid, p46 
21 Ibid, p56 
22 Ibid, p63 
23 Ibid, 59 
24 Ibid, p69-70 
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While the cavalry’s fate following the Great War would primarily depend upon “acts of 
faith”25 and the endorsement by older cavalry officers and military men, the Treaty of Versailles 
decreed that mounted troops would continue to exist and survive as part of Germany’s military 
force. However, the question of whether cavalry was seen as a necessary component of the army 
or rather an obsolete allusion of military power remained. Technology certainly seemed limited 
in 1918 and the opinions and favor towards motorized vehicles were to operate alongside 
mounted troops remained a popular one.26 
 
Treaty of Versailles, 1919 
The prevalence of the horse within the German Army was in part due to the Treaty of 
Versailles following World War I. Not only did the Treaty limit the size of the army, but it also 
placed the horse in a prominent position, both in a military sense and a reparation sense as well. 
Part V of the Treaty encompasses the Military, Naval and Air Clauses. Section 1 of 
Article 160 limited the German Army to 100,000 men divided amongst three divisions of cavalry 
and seven infantry divisions. Officers and depots were included in the one hundred thousand. 
Section 2 details that each cavalry regiment, and further each infantry regiment, were allowed 
their own depot. The three cavalry divisions consisted of 18 regiments and 16,400 men.27 
Part III of Table No. I of the treaty further breaks down the cavalry division, assigning a 
maximum of 275 officers and 5,250 NCOs and men per unit. This included horse artillery and 
 
25 Ibid, p72 
26 Ibid, p76 
27 Treaty of Versailles - Knox, Philander C. Treaty of Versailles. (Washington, Govt. print. Off, 1919. Web. 
https://lccn.loc.gov/43036001) 
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the cavalry regiment. Table No. II assigned 18,000 carbines to the cavalry divisions, along with 
36 heavy machine guns and 36 7.7 cm guns.28 
Annex IV, Section 2 allowed the Allied and Associated Governments to file with the 
Reparation Commission for articles such as animals, equipment, tools, and reconstruction 
materials. Section 6 goes into further detail, listing the monthly installments Germany was to 
owe France and Belgium. The two countries were to receive, in decent health, stallions, mares, 
and fillies of various breeds. Specifically, France was to receive 500 stallions (ages 3 to 7), and 
30,000 fillies and mares (18 months to 7 years old). The mares and fillies were to be Ardennes, 
Boulonnais, or Belgian. Belgium was to receive large Belgian type horses: 200 stallions, 5,000 
mares, and 5,000 fillies. In addition, both governments were to receive bulls, cows, rams, sheep, 
and goats.29 
The Treaty of Versailles handicapped the German Army following the end of World War 
I. Versailles restricted motor vehicle usage as well as forbidding the use of modern weapons 
(tanks, heavy artillery, anti-aircraft guns, etc.). At the time of the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles, cavalry was considered outdated and of little threat. Armed with lances, even a large 
cavalry force seemed to have no place in modern warfare. Furthermore, maintaining a calvary of 
that size required a large financial commitment, as procuring, training, and maintaining horses 
was costly. Money allocated to the cavalry could therefore not be spent on other military 
matters.30 
Apart from the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of Rapallo is worth mentioning. The 




30 Richter, Klaus Christian. Cavalry of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1945. (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1995.) 
pages 9-10 
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forgave reparations from World War I and laid the groundwork to resume diplomatic relations.31 
Importantly, this treaty allowed the two nations to establish military cooperation, although 
Germany would later disregard this alliance and invade the Soviet Union. Upon doing so, they 
would also disregard the Treaty of Berlin, which had enabled the Germans to secretly test 
equipment in Russia in the years leading up to the war.32 
 
Hitler’s Rearmament and Nazi Germany 
Adolf Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933. Immediately, 
he began to assert his vision for Germany. The biggest obstacle in his path remained the 
Reichstag and the existing Parliament. Hitler, if he would attain any power or influence as 
Chancellor, would need a majority in the Parliament, of which they held less than half.33 In order 
for his vision to manifest and lead Germany, he would need to dissolve the former Reichstag and 
remove those who stood in his way of power. He would also need to rearm Germany and give 
her a military fit for his vision of a ‘Thousand-Year Reich.’ What occurred was the infamous 
Reichstag Fire and a complete upheaval of German leadership. 
The military arm of Hitler’s regime was to be an important institution, and even 
Versailles would not limit him. Rearmament began secretly, opposed and doubted by military 
leadership until military sovereignty was announced on March 16, 1935.34 This marked the 
change from the Reichswehr to the Wehrmacht, and a reinvention of German identity up until 
 
31 “Rapallo Treaty.” A Dictionary of Contemporary World History. Oxford University Press, March 21, 2019. 
32 Müller, p 53 
33 Shirer, Willian L., and Ron Rosenbaum. “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany.” 
(Simon& Schuster, 2011.), pages 188-189 
34 Müller, Rolf-Dieter, and Janice W. Ancker. Hitler’s Wehrmacht, 1935-1945. (Lexington, KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2016.), p7 
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that point in time.35 Following the proclamation, the rearmament of the German Army 
accelerated rapidly, with Hitler fully and irrevocably spurning the Treaty of Versailles. The army 
was expanded to 103 divisions, and the draft, which had been forbidden under Versailles, was 
reinstated. The Sturmabteilung (SA) was ousted to make room for the Schutzstaffel (SS), the 
fanatical wing of the German Army known for horrendous war crimes and elite status.36 
Immediately, cracks broke through Hitler’s operation. Versailles had limited military 
production (guns, tanks, etc.), and the eligible population with military training for enlistment 
was severely lacking, due to a decline in births following World War I and an irregular eligibility 
limitation imposed by Versailles.37 Regardless, Hitler drove expansion forward, demanding an 
expedited timeline and unveiling the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine. Germany was not prepared 
for the rapid pace it was to see herself strain under. The 1930s had dealt a hard hand to Germany, 
and the nation was reeling from a recession and high levels of unemployment. In order to sustain 
the expanding military, reduced spending in the civilian sector would have to be enforced, and 
men would need to be conscripted from the workforce.38  
The economy and nation were further strained due to a shortage of steel and iron; metals 
desperately needed for motorization and armament. Large scale projects and programs initiated 
by Hitler competed with depleted railways for precious iron and steel. Iron and steel were 
allocated throughout the Reich, for barracks and Army infrastructure. Metal was also sent to 
build fortifications along the western lines. Weapons, ammunition, equipment, and motor vehicle 
 
35 Richter, p9 - The Law or Edict for the Building up of the Armed Forces/Wehrmacht 
36 Müller, p10 
37 Ibid, p12 
38 Ibid, p15 
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production subsequentially fought for adequate steel.39 Remaining metals initiated a struggle 
amongst the Army, Kriegsmarine, and the Luftwaffe. 
Over the battle for metal and material, the shortfalls of the leadership structure of the 
Third Reich began to show. Until later in the war, Hitler partook a passive role in the decision 
making of the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe.40 Thus, there was a misalignment among top 
leadership, and naturally there was rivalry and competition amongst the different military 
branches, and of course, the individual ambitions of the leadership. 
Apart from limited steel resources, the German army’s attempt at truck and car 
production and innovation was flawed in more ways than one; after a period of stagnation, 
production was suddenly accelerated. Reliance on foreign fuel sources influenced production 
numbers - in 1934, Germany saw 85% of her petroleum usage coming from foreign sources.41 
The Army was reluctant to produce large numbers of vehicles in models that would soon become 
obsolete.42 Moreover, innovation was not streamlined, and the German Army, without proper 
alignment or resources and ideas, churned out twenty-nine models of cars and twenty-three 
models of trucks.43 Eventually, civilian cars and trucks would fill the gaps during the campaigns, 
although this compounded the difficulties with available spare parts and mechanics, not to 
mention the linguistic disparities when the Germans would take foreign vehicles. There was a 
tradeoff in production, whether to prioritize tanks over trucks. The issues of metal and fuel 
continued to be a problem and thus, by 1941, the Germans had more horses than vehicles.44 
 
39 Johnson, Paul Louis. Horses of the German Army in World War II. (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2006.) 
p9 
40 Müller, p18 
41 DiNardo, R. Mechanized juggernaut or military anachronism?: horses and the German army of World War II. 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p7 
42 Johnson, p 9 
43 Dorondo, p 120 
44 Müller, p54 
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Another source of misalignment within the German army was the organization and 
composition of the army, throughout the war. The configuration of units was inconsistent, with 
elite status folding to the enlistment of child soldiers and older volunteers, among others. 
Although, even at the beginning of the war, units such as the Luftwaffe suffered from the lack of 
training and infantry experience received by the NCOs and officers.45 The training and armament 
of the army was not modernized or adapted to the demands of Hitler and to the demands of the 
period. This is seen in the firepower choices of the Germans, which were not improved upon 
until the 1940s.46 Furthermore, blending the old units of the Reichstag army with the newly 
formed and motorized infantry divisions created an elitist competition and rivalry within the 
ranks.47 
An interesting organizational addition to the Wehrmacht were battalions composed of 
soldiers with similar ailments. Germany pressed every able-bodied man into service and later 
even adapted criteria so that handicapped or otherwise disabled persons could still be used in 
security work or combat. This is how so-called “ear battalions” or “stomach battalions” came 
about.48 The effectiveness of these units is up for debate, and not just for the hypocrisy of the 
murder, intentional or otherwise, of injured or handicapped people within the army and within 
the nation.49 
Supplying recruits and replacements to an army woven with old and new soldiers proved 
to be an interesting undertaking; shortfalls in training and the inexperienced younger generation 
spurred the creation of such programs as Hitler Youth and the Reich Labor Service.50 These 
 
45 Ibid, p47 
46 Ibid, p48 
47 Ibid, 46 
48 Ibid, p84-85 
49 Ibid, p85 
50 Ibid, p93 
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programs actually aided to curb unemployment and to build support for the NSDAP. The RAD, 
Riechsarbeitsdient, was a mandatory program for young adults that placed them in farms or other 
labor services. The intense program drilled as if it were a military program and included training 
in physical fitness, political indoctrination, marksmanship, and horsemanship.51 Upon 
completion of these programs, men would then be drafted into the army. 
Germany entered the war arguably too fast, as the shortcomings in organization and 
allocation of resources would come to fruition later on, increasing the reliance on horses. The 
rapid pace at which the nation undertook rearmament ultimately became a handicap, as the 


















51 Garson, Paul. Warhorses of Germany: The Myth of the mechanized Blitzkrieg. (Gloucestershire: Amberley 
Publishing, 2018.), p 30 
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ON HORSES AND MEN 
 
Strategy and Operation Planning 
The outlook on the future of warfare following the eve of the First World War was 
essentially a discussion on the level of involvement of motorized and mechanized vehicles. To 
an extent, this debate indirectly was also about the role of the horse. Heinze Guderian of 
Germany, Basil Liddell Hart of Great Britain, and Charles de Gaulle of France, amongst other 
prominent figures, all voiced support behind the age of tanks. Unsurprisingly, the power of 
aircraft was only increasing. Cavalry veterans and members were a part of the opposition, 
supporting their continued presence. In an extreme opinion, General Natzmer of Germany 
reportedly was quoted saying “they’re supposed to carry flour” in reference to trucks in battle.52  
 Was the world prepared for mechanized war? The question was not, at that time, if 
warfare was not going to continue to be mechanized. The real question, at the root of all of it, 
was how to best employ vehicles and what was practical and logistical given the level of 
mechanization within the nation. Artillery was already understood and highly considered as 
being more effective than infantry. Using less men and firing more often, artillery also took up 
less space on the front, thus opening up more line for artillery units. The main disadvantage of 
artillery was its lack of mobility, and inability to access certain terrains.53 
 There were those who called for the end of calvary altogether, included amongst them, J. 
F. C. Fuller of Great Britain.54 He supported this by referring to the disparity in speed between 
 
52 Citino, R. (2002). Quest for decisive victory: from stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-1940.  (University 
Press of Kansas.) p 183 
53 Von Clausewitz, General Carl. Principles of War. Harrisburg, PA: The Military Publishing Company, 1936.) 
pages 27-28 
54 Citino, p185 
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tanks and cavalry.55 Destruction, for Fuller, could only be avoided with a full mechanization. 
Cavalry was still the obvious choice for reconnaissance, however. Considering the horse, at 
speed, could cover approximately 150 miles a day, cavalry was an obvious choice to operate 
over all terrain and with the added advantage of easily hiding and moving at night. 56  
 In a foreword for U.S. Army Military History institute publication MS #P-090, 
Generaloberst Franz Halder defends his position against the calvary, pointing towards the 
financial burden of using horses but also the improbability to war ever being waged in the Artic 
or Caucasus; arenas that closely resembles Russia or the terrain the mountain troops faced.57 
Generalmajor Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, the main contributor to this report, was a 
cavalryman-turned-panzer commander, also shared this view, discussing that while a popular 
opinion in 1941-1942 was that horses were “indispensable” in Russia, motor vehicles still held 
the upper hand in “striking power” and “high mobility.”58 However, the report does commend 
the use of horses in specific terrain, such as that of Finland, but acknowledged that the “decisive 
actions of a war…are not conducted in such terrain.”59 The report goes even further to analyze 
operations by cavalry in Russia, noting that the “mission could have been performed by a 
motorized divisions with equal chance of success.”60 
Did horseflesh and steel mix? It certainly did not on the battlefield, an observation 
supported by manuscripts of the early twentieth century. The German Army attempted to 
combine the two in military maneuvers before the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
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Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP, came into power. Practicing river crossings61 was considered to be a 
crucial training component for not only the cavalry, but also for the army. A 1932 training 
maneuver showed just how difficult it was to combine vehicles and horses. This particular river 
crossing showcased “intense confusion” of those involved and the excessive movements along 
the riverbanks was proved to be “fatiguing.”62 
Successful charges of cavalry against firearms, unsurprisingly were few and far between. 
However, as Friedrich von Bernarrdi notes in his tactical writing, cavalry charges in modern war 
were much less decisive in the outcomes as they had been before rifles and guns opposed steel 
and horseflesh. He referred to the cavalry’s ideology as ‘fiction’, in relation to the relevancy of 
the other military arms. Of course, on the advent of modern military technology and in pursuit of 
advancement in war, the idea of a charge in battle, linked to images of Napoleon and a different 
era, was relegated to be a thing of the past. 63 
Von Bernarrdi did note that he was in favor of a cavalry still holding a charge, if infantry 
positions allowed one to be successful. He specifically references second and third lines of 
infantry, in particular to a situation in which the men, disillusioned and out-of-hand, would be 
taken advantage of by bold cavalrymen.64 This is where the potential success of cavalry lay, in 
attacks from the flank or behind, especially if artillery was at the front.65 
The issue, Bernarrdi writes, is the opinion of the cavalry still thinking of older war, in 
that the charge was still to be a decisive and important tactical maneuver. The cavalry was no 
longer necessary for artillery or infantry work. The real role would lie in the reconnoitering and 
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screening ability, the purpose of which was to understand the enemy and their movements. 
Surprise and speed, especially against long range artillery, was crucial for success. Bernarrdi 
suggested employing cavalry in front, to meet the opposing cavalry and then discover the 
movements of the enemy.66 
The cavalry would also need to be more than an offensive device. Indeed, Bernarrdi felt 
that the cavalry was to be an important part of intelligence operations, with patrols and 
transmission duties.67 Bernarrdi warned of the tendency for idleness if the cavalry were allowed 
to be too close to the army.68 Of course, one can recall the experiences of the British cavalry 
during the Battle of the Somme in World War I and this ideology is not far from the truth. 
Military and war leaders, who took great pains to write manuals of tactics, stressed the 
fading role of the cavalry. Although many would recommend a continued use, albeit in a 
different manner, one more suited towards intelligence. In the face of modern warfare, the 
calvary and their antiquated charge stood no chance against guns and machinery. 
The new placement of the cavalry was behind the front line and in reconnaissance and 
intelligence. Von Clausewitz angled for the calvary to be placed behind the infantry, to be used 
in the pursuit of retreating troops and convey a “demoralizing effect.”69 In this manner, they 
were to be used in support of the infantry. Bernarrdi also reiterated this approach, for he viewed 
the main army as needing more time for preparatory measures and here the cavalry held greater 
importance in their strategical contributions.70 So it was to be that the cavalry’s new role in the 
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modern army was for the advancement of the infantry, in a supporting position to the overall 
combined armed forces.71 
General Hans von Seeckt, the chief of Army Command for Germany, was responsible for 
the military strategy and composition of the army. He began preparations in the context of 
Versailles, considering the limited army size and weaponry allotments. At the core of his 
strategy, was the idea that to defeat Germany’s larger neighboring armies, she must be mobile 
and fit enough to fight off surprise attacks. This mobility came from the large number of horses 
integrated within all branches. Furthermore, a prepared infantry and a “complement” of 
mechanized vehicles rounded out the “highly mobile, highly capable forces” that Seeckt 
envisioned.72 The key idea behind Seeckt’s reasoning was considering the army forces as a 
whole, rather than singling out a unit or component individually. In this way, horses and calvary 
retained their role in the army. This strategy played out later in the war, when the use of horses 
was necessary due to the loss of vehicles from fuel shortages, enemy attacks, or movement to 
more necessary positionings. German strategy called for clustered vehicles in fully motorized 
units or divisions, rather than dispersing them amongst foot soldiers and horses.73 
German war was considered as either Stellungskrieg or Bewegunskrieg – war of position 
and war of movement, respectively.74 These two doctrines incorporated the tanks and blitzkrieg, 
but also retained a role for the cavalry and infantry. For indeed, “combined arms had been the 
secret of success in war from time immemorial” and would continue to be a recipe for success 
moving forward.75 This combination, once again, was the question which was at the forefront of 
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military planners following World War I and on the cusp of World War II. This relation amongst 
all military components also extended to the newly created Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, 
although for the purposes of this paper, the disparity between the speed of tanks, horses, and foot 
infantry presents the more crucial comparison. 
It must be reiterated that the competition and miscommunication amongst the branches 
and leaders of the German Army influenced the strategies and policies developed by Germany. 
What this developed into, was a process in which military leaders created strategy, and then “top 
bodies” inputting their own opinions and ideas.76 The misalignment was continuous throughout 
the leadership. This feeds into the incapability of Germany’s leaders to assess correctly certain 
opponents, such as the Soviets in Operation Barbarossa. The Germans were “adventurous” and 
“unscrupulous” in planning Barbarossa, and the operation exposed the broader issues of the army 
with the contradiction between their goals and its actual strength.77 
 
Truppenführung 
The German manual, Truppenführung, served as the basic handbook for war and outlined 
command, field service, and joint operations. While considering training, it is important to note 
the role that the manual laid out for the cavalry, including retaining the sections on cavalry even 
with the addition of portions dedicated to tanks and motor vehicles, which would take over many 
of the cavalry’s original operational scope. Truppenführung details a cavalry brigade to be 
composed of two regiments, with three brigades making up a division. Within the division there 
 
76 “Politics and Strategy in the Second World War: Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States: Papers Presented Under the Auspices of the International Committee for the History of the Second 
World War, San Francisco, August 26, 1975.” (Manhattan, Kan: [Military affairs/Aerospace historian Publishers], 
1976.) p 3 
77 Ibid, p9 
 McFarland 25 
would also be a mounted reconnaissance regiment, a motorized reconnaissance battalion, an 
antitank battalion, a combat engineer battalion, a signal battalion, and an artillery battalion.78 
The manual outlines both technical aspects of a cavalry’s operating, as well as noting the 
disadvantages, such as vulnerability to air attack. Chapter III of the manual outlines 
reconnaissance and includes the note of cavalry as having the best advantage over all terrain.79 
Additional sections outline screening capabilities, as well as instructions to quarter and shelter. 
The manual even gets as specific as noting that “cavalry will not block the center of the road.”80 
 
The Bond Between Man and Beast 
 
“You don’t seem to have any idea of what our operations on horse-back are 
like…if we cover 90 kilometers, we need 14 to 16 hours, and that means from 
four in the morning to ten at night. Then at the end of all that, we have to look 
after the horses, which takes at least an hour, and at night be on stable watch 
for another one or two hours. An infantryman nowadays can march maybe 50 
kilometers in a day. If he’s given a 20-minute break, he lies down on the grass 
verge and takes it easy. But the cavalryman has to water his horse, fetching the 
water from as far as 200 meters away. In the infantry, two hours’ rest are two 
hours’ rest; but we need an hour and a quarter for the horse, what with 
unsaddling and saddling up again, fetching the animal water, food and so on. 
And if we want to eat, we still have to hold the horse…. the infantryman’s feet 
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may ache but so do the cavalryman’s-for he’s had to walk 50 kilometers too, in 
boots made for riding, not marching…the horseman always has to lead his 
mount when he’s on foot. After a while he has to pull it because it’s had 
enough. Then he has to halt, because its stumbling forward…. [the cavalry] 
have to be eternal gipsies.”81 
 
An excerpt from a letter of a cavalryman in the 1st Mounted Regiment captures the daily 
routine of a German cavalryman in combat. Early mornings were spent preparing for a long day 
of riding and walking, anticipating that the horse’s needs would always come before their own. 
A Corporal in the 1st Mounted Regiment described in his diary the morning of September 1, 
1939, the outbreak of World War II; He wrote of a bugle call at 2 a.m. and the cavalry riding 
through the night to arrive in Poland and prepare for war.82 
The bond between horse and rider can rival that between soldiers and can only really be 
understood by a fellow horseman. For the cavalry, the riders had to entrust their lives to the 
animal below them, as the horse entrusted its wellbeing with the man on his back. The 
relationship did vary of course; a cavalryman may have viewed his horse as a piece of equipment 
or machinery, to be replaced when worn out or dead. But why is that man has always named his 
horse? One can imagine, and indeed read, that a rider was in-tune with his animal, name or not. 
Albert Schwenn, a cavalryman whose account is discussed in the following, was a soldier who 
named his horse, and noted that “[Peter] was a pleasant creature.”83 
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This working bond can be considered deep and emotional, or a necessity. In a dispatch, a 
rider in the 1st Cavalry Brigade writes of his horse Herzog, and how he felt that his animal could 
take no more, and indeed his horse fell.84 This connection comes after spending countless hours 
with the animal partner, working and listening to every movement or expression. One can 
compare this relationship with modern-day military dogs and their soldiers. U.S. Army Corporal 
Dustin Borchardt is one such soldier, who has “adapted” to his dog, Pearl, and is so in tune with 
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THE HORSE IN WAR 
 
 The German military was divided into three branches: the army, the air force, and the 
navy. The Waffen-SS has been considered and regarded as an unofficial fourth branch. 
Throughout the war, division and armies were rearranged and shuffled. Basic organization of the 
army, Heer, grouped regiments into divisions, which would be combined to form a corps. 
Armies consisting of two or more divisions would group together to form an ‘army’ which in 
turn would be grouped into an ‘army group.’86 Apart from troops, there were several 
headquarters established in 1939, as well as the General Staff. Troops and support staff finished 
the organizational logistics.87 While the air force theoretically would be mostly in the air, the 
Luftwaffe deployed roughly 200,000 men as infantry, and thus retained ground support.88 All of 
this cumulates into a large number of horses being used, both by cavalry but also by infantry, 
mountain divisions, division headquarters, engineer battalions, and the supply chain. 
Deploying in the war, the German army was divided into waves, with progressively 
fewer mobile forces. In this way, the first wave served the propaganda purposes of the army and 
supported the image of a blitzkrieg while the latter divisions were far less mobile.89 Indeed, 
especially by the end of the war, many divisions were crafted to be more than they were, with 
“descriptive names” masking the “pathetic equipment and weapons” that were sorry excuses at 
best for combat units.90 The infamous panzer units would have been in the first wave, and 
interestingly enough, the creation of these concentrated motorized forces was influenced by the 
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reliance upon horses. Consider a few panzers and motorized units spread throughout the army 
intermingled with horse-drawn support, or a smaller but fully motorized force. In this sense, the 
motorized components were more effective when grouped together.91 
The German Army, by official accounts, used around 2.75 million horses during World 
War II.92 Accounts vary and again, these numbers are based on official records. Unofficially, 
their rosters were comprised of Russian panje horses and horses requisitioned from fields and 
towns. In reality, the number of horses used most likely was much larger than the official 
registers. On average, the German Army employed approximately 1.1 million horses at any 
given time during the war period.93 The Germans utilized horses (both of the draft and riding 
variety), mules, and donkeys for their transportation and military needs. Horses were a primary 
means of transport as the German Army was never fully motorized. In 1943, of the 322 
divisions, composed of German Army and SS, only 52 divisions were motorized. By 1944, only 
42 of the 264 existing combat divisions were motorized.94 
While infantry marched on foot, the supply chain was almost entirely horse-drawn, 
carrying supplies and weapons behind rows of troops. Each German infantry division had 
approximately 5,300 horses, 1,100 horse-drawn vehicles, 950 motor vehicles, and 430 
motorcycles. As the war progressed, supply difficulties and vehicle upkeep grew difficult – the 
number was reduced to 400 motorcycles and 400 vehicles. Consequentially, the number of 
horses per division increased to 6,300. Divisions in 1944 had around 4,600 horses, 1,400 horse-
drawn vehicles, 600 motor vehicles, and 150 motorcycles.95 
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Horses can be more adapt than vehicles when it comes to certain terrain, such as 
mountains or thin paths. This is one of the reasons the horse retained significance within the 
army. Where mud or water can stop cars or trucks, horses can plow on, swim on, march on and 
continue the way. 
 
Suitability of Breeds 
Horses can be separated into three relatively distinct groups: cold-blooded, hot-blooded, 
and warm-blooded. These groups do not refer to the temperature of the horses’ blood, but rather 
the temperament of the horse and the relative purpose of its breeding. Hot blooded horses are 
very athletic, spirited, and energetic. The best example would be the Thoroughbred – a horse 
bred for racing and sport, known for its sensitivity, hot temper, and delicate legs. The cold bloods 
are the draft horses – calm, large animals ideal for pulling carriages and carts such as the 
Budweiser Clydesdales. The warmbloods are a mix of hot and cold; they are typically heavier 
than the hot bloods while still being more athletic than the cold bloods. Their more temperate 
nature makes them ideal riding and show horses. Many popular breeds still originate from 
Germany and former East Prussia: the Hanoverian, the Trakehner, the Oldenburg, and the 
Holsteiner, among others, named for the specific regions in which they were bred or originated 
from.96  
Cavalry horses in the German army looked and were built different than their modern 
descendants. Horses were smaller with larger bone mass; today, the German warmbloods are big 
and lean, making them ideal athletes. In fact, it was determined that smaller horses were ideally 
suited for war, although broad ribs and strong bones were preferred.97 
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The Hanoverian and the closely related Oldenburg are bred in the region of Hanover. 
These horses developed a positive reputation in the 17th century, being used by the Swedish and 
English armies, as well as receiving high praise from the Spanish Netherlands. Concentrated 
breeding efforts were spurred by King George II of Great Britain, as well as the formation of the 
Kingdom of Hanover, following the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The horse-breeding economy 
was actually strengthened during the depression of 1923-1924, as horses were viewed as 
investments which retained value over time. Compared to the Trakehner, the Hanoverian of 
World War II had a heavier head, overall good temperament, and excelled in jumping. 
The East Prussian Central State Stud at Trakehnen was founded between the years 1726 
and 1732 by the warrior king, Frederick William I. This wet-moorland-turned-pastureland 
produced the Trakehner breed, which would eventually be the preferred mount of the 
Wehrmacht. 
The Russian Panje horse, which was smaller than the horses the Germans were used to, 
proved to be hardy and a much-needed asset in the Eastern campaigns. This small horse could 
withstand the harsh and cold environment, often with little cover. In the winter, the Germans 
acquired Russian sleds, which the small panje horses could easily pull over the ice and snow. 
While the American army relied more on mules than the Germans, the half-donkey half-
horse hybrid proved a sturdy and reliable animal. Mules fell sick less often, required less food 
than their equine counterparts, and did not react as poorly to loud noises.98 Mules and pack 
horses were mainly used by the German mountain divisions.99 
Once the horse was acquired under the German Army, they could be separated into draft 
horses or riding horses, otherwise referred to as mounts. Riding horses were partitioned amongst 
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officers, cavalry, infantry-mounted vehicles, and other branches. Light draft horses were 
classified as pole horses, middle or leading. Heavy draft horses were used for artillery or other 
branches. And yet still there were the extra-heavy draft horses used for the heavy artillery.100  
It should be noted that similar care went into selecting riders for these horses. For the 
cavalry, riders must have been fit, light, “mentally alert” and “well-coordinated.”101 For handling 
the horses within the infantry, strong, but kind men were used, such as drivers with good 
temperaments and knowledge of horses. Horses for missions were chosen based on the 
assignment, and men paired the same way. 102 It is not enough to know how to ride, but it is 




Horses are “delicate creature[s]”103 and require intensive and extensive care to maintain 
them in working condition. In the context of war, this required adequate feed, water, shelter, rest, 
and grooming. Fodder, throughout the war, was not always readily available on the front lines 
and required extensive space in the supply trains. Horses, as large and menacing as they may be, 
are rather susceptible to many forms of diseases, and like humans, can fall victim to extreme heat 
or cold, dampness or dryness. There are plants which are poisonous, insects that bite, and too 
much stress may cause a horse to colic, an incident in which the intestines get jumbled and cause 
the horse immense discomfort and even death. A misstep can wretch a forelock and tear a tendon 
and a stone bruise will render a horse lame to walk. Of course, when properly taken care of, 
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horses are quite impressive and can travel many miles, conquer obstacles, and can brave the 
toughest conditions. At the end of the day, it can be a delicate balance between peak performance 
and respite for these four-legged animals. 
The horse, while adapt at conquering terrain inaccessible by wheeled vehicles, faced 
logistical and efficiency shortcomings compared to trucks or even infantry on foot. For matters 
of care, horses needed to be fed, watered, and groomed every day. Grooming was essential to lift 
dirt and mud from the coat, and to prevent sores, either from the collar and harness of transport 
horses, or from the saddle and blanket on cavalry mounts.104 Depending on conditions, a horse 
may drink anywhere from 20 to 60 liters of water a day, or 5 to 15 gallons.105 Size and workload 
also dictated feed, with grain rations ranging anywhere from eight to twelve pounds, and hay at 
fourteen to eighteen pounds a day. Grazing on grass is typically only sufficient for a horse with 
no work, but in order for grass to be sufficient for a working horse, the animal would have to 
graze for most of the day. Providing fodder and grain for the horses took up a large part of the 
supply chain, with the most efficient method being bringing up fodder from the rear of the unit, 
as to avoid sending troops to forage.106 Task forces were indeed assembled with the sole purpose 
of securing food for the horses.  Of course, this extended to supply issues with other gear, such 
as blankets, for which men would have to be spared. 107 
Horsemen know that caring for horses takes time, but time can be precious in war. Horses 
required ample amounts of rest as to not burn out and perform their best. For example, a horse 
needed to rest once a week, as working for even ten days without rest would result in strain and 
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fatigue. Of course, a horse could be in light work and could work for up to three weeks without 
rest, but as conditions and workload increased, a horse would need more rest to be able to 
continue. Recovery from work strain could take several days. After intense combat, a horse 
would also need a rest period to regain its strength. Many times, the frequency of operations and 
the state of the cavalry unit dictated the rest periods for the horses. Acclimating new mounts to 
the ‘herd’ or even pairing new horses to pull wagons required time, anywhere from days to 
weeks. Decent rest required bedding and stables; the Red Army adapted a system of advance 
scouts to secure suitable buildings, as well as maintaining stables at convenient positions along 
supply routes and railheads.108  
Artillery team horses required maintenance in the form of hitching and unhitching at the 
start and end of each day. Harnessing a two-horse team could take up to half an hour and 
required two men. A heavy piece of artillery pulled by six horses could take over an hour to 
hitch, if attended to by six or more men. 109  At the end of the day, the horses would have to be 
unhitched, and cared for appropriately with feed and grooming. The harnesses would have to be 
stored as to not be tangled, and presumably also cleaned, as sweat and dirt are detrimental to 
leather. A driver would likely spend over an hour caring for the horses, as opposed to a truck 
driver.110 Comparatively, one can assume a fair amount of time and care went into tacking up a 
riding mount. 
Caring for the horses in the German Army also required extensive veterinary personnel 
and resources. Command and directorate fell to General Curt Schulze who, from 1938 to 1945, 
served as Veterinarian Inspector General of the Army Veterinary Service. At any given point, 
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Schulze oversaw 1.25million horses, along with 162,000 soldiers and blacksmiths.111 Each 
cavalry division was assigned two vet companies composed of two collection stations. First aid 
was administered at these stations, while injured and captured horses were sent to vet hospitals. 
Impressively, the return to active-duty rate was 75%, meaning 3 out of 4 horses returned to work 
after being treated.112 The most common illness seen by the German veterinarians was mange, a 
contagious skin disease. Other diseases seen were equine pneumonia, frostbite, and glanders.113 
 
The Battle Horse and the Supply Chain 
A ‘Battle Horse’ refers to the fourth horse of a knight’s string. The battle horse was last 
behind the charger, the palfrey, and the courser. This animal was a work animal, destined to 
never be ridden by the knight, but be burdened down with the weight of extra equipment and 
baggage.114 While cavalry and battle horses no longer donned shields and chainmail, the crucial 
role of a baggage horse or pack animal was still prevalent into the twentieth century.  
The German Army utilized one-, two-, four-, and six- horse teams, depending on the 
weight and manner of their haul. A majority of the artillery used was horse-drawn. Wagons 
unloaded could weigh well over 2,000 pounds and thus required heavy horses to pull.115 The 
French army can be pointed to as the beginning of soldiers riding with their horses, tacked up as 
a sort of ‘out-rider’ as the army began to use more artillery; German soldiers would indeed ride 
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and steer the draft horses from their backs. For a riding draft horse, a Sielengeschirr 25 breast 
harness was used in addition to the saddle.116  
 
Artillery 
While the Treaty of Versailles initially limited the artillery allowed for the German 
Army, the 105mm and 150mm guns became the standard guns during the war. Under the Treaty, 
Germany was originally limited to 77mm and leFH16s, or the light field howitzers. The light 
field howitzers were an adaptation of a 1909 howitzer, with a longer barrel and changed shield. 
The howitzer had two wheels and would be hitched to a horse team to pull. The German Army 
used both horse-drawn and horse artillery. The difference being that with horse artillery, every 
gunner or member of the crew was mounted.117 For the purposes of this thesis, the terms will be 
used interchangeably. 
The leFH16 was introduced in 1909 and had a barrel length of 1.58 meters. It sat on two 
wheels in a box-trail carriage.118 There were actually two models of the leFH16, one by Krupp 
and the other by Rheinmetall. Rheinmetall’s gun had a barrel length of 2.29 meters. This leFH16 
continued to be used throughout World War II, and was considered a success across all aspects, 
from mobility to range.119  The leFH16 nA was an adaption of the former, without a handle and 
with added stiffeners to strengthen the gun. Additional modifications included larger springs and 
an ice spade.120  
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The leFH 18 was introduced in 1937, although the German Army had a total of 980 of the 
older models.121 The leFH 18 was an improvement on the 16, with a longer barrel of 294.1 cm 
and a range of just over 10km. The carriage was a split trail with folding spades, and the gun 
even had shock absorbers. The 75mm light infantry gun was designed specifically to be horse-
drawn. The howitzer, or le.I.G.18, was pulled by a six-horse team (or in some cases a motorized 
prime mover). Dependent on a unit’s Table of Equipment or TOE, there would be four or six per 
cavalry unit. The wagons upon which these guns rode had large, spoked wheels, earning the 
nickname “gypsy artillery.” A cavalry regiment would also have three 37mm anti-tank guns in 
the headquarters troop.122 Overall, the 18 was easier to tow, had better mobility, and production 
was simpler.123 
For other artillery, the Germans possessed many different models. The sMG 08 or the 
MG 08 was the principle heavy machine gun used by the German army into the 1930s. Used in 
addition to the cavalry’s individual weapons, this gun, adopted by the German army in 1908, 
supplied devastating firepower during World War I. However, the MG 08 was heavy, weighing 
forty pounds initially without ammunition or coolant water. The MG 08/15 and MG 08/18 were 
lighter variations both introduced in the 1910s.124 These guns were pulled by a six-horse team 
attached to the wagon. 
The 1920s saw the German army adopting the Dreyse model MG13 gun, which proved 
considerably lighter than the MG 08s and also offered a higher rate of fire. In 1936 the MG34125 
replaced the MG 08s and 13s. Although the MG34 eventually saw itself replaced by the MG42 
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or ‘Hitler’s buzz-saw’.126 The 34 and 42 were improvements upon the older gun models. The 34 
was air-cooled and could shoot 300 to 400 rounds a minute. The MG 42 improved upon this, 
with 800 to 900 rounds a minute. The MG 34 was used by the cavalry more than the 42s, which 
were produced to meet the demands of the army after 1943.127 The 42s were carried, not on 
wagons, but in scabbards on the gunner’s saddle. 
The 150mm guns were also pulled by a team of six horses, as it weighed around four 
tons.128 In some cases, the load proved to be too heavy for even the heaviest of draft animals.129 
 A machine gun crew consisted of eight men and ten horses. There was the gun 
commander and his horse holder, four gunners, and two pack horse leaders who handled two 
horses apiece.130 Upon delivering the artillery, the handlers would lead the horses to safety while 
the crew began to work.131 
 
Supply Chain 
Horses provided the primary mode of transport for the supply train of the German Army. 
They pulled food, supplies, ammunition, field kitchens and bakeries, medical units, and more. 
Similar to artillery, teams of horses varied depending on the load. For example, a 0.75-ton HF.12 
kitchen required a two-horse team.132 On the flip side, the ‘horse killer’ wagon required six 
horses to pull the iron Hf.2 transport wagon.133 Infantry divisions were restricted to remaining 
close to their horses and not advancing too quickly as to separate from them. In addition, 
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motorized and Panzer units could not travel extensively or quickly, and thus be separated from 
the infantry. 
To comprehend the vast reliance on horses by the German Army,134 one must look at the 
Polish campaign, when the Germans required the Poles to supply roughly 4,000 horses per week 
in April 1940. Also, during the campaign, the 231st Division, while in Poland and not required to 
be in action, was immobilized due to equine pneumonia sweeping through the mounts.135 
Transport columns would be stopped completely when horses came down with equine 
tuberculosis or any other contagious, debilitating disease. Perhaps the saving grace in Poland as 
compared to the Soviet Union was that of the weather – good fair weather is better for sick 
horses than bitter cold.136 
During the Russian invasion, the Germans experienced the immense shortcomings of an 
extensive, but overstrained supply chain. The horses were not accustomed to hot Russian 
summers or the brutal winters. Shipping fodder to the front only increased the volume in the 
supply chains, and often resulted in shortages. Advancement was delayed in the summer, when 
the horses required long and frequent water breaks. Shortages even affected the availability 
feedbags, and while the introduction of troughs seemed an easier and simple solution, shared 
feeding spaces only increased the chances for spreading diseases.137 
Russia revealed even more disadvantages to using horseflesh when the winter took up to 
1,000 horses a day. The army struggled with disease, and the veterinary hospitals were 4-6 times 
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at capacity. The infantry divisions needed up to over 6,000 horses to move and with little in 
reserve, were at the mercy of the environment.138 
A total of 180,000 horses were lost in the winter months of 1941. This includes horses 
which were sold due to being too weak to work, and horses killed for food.139 To make up for 
this shortcoming, and the losses incurred at Stalingrad, the Germans authorized that horses could 
be pulled to the east from Western divisions. Once artillery was placed in permanent locations, 
the need for horses to pull them dissipated. In addition, infantry divisional requirements were 
reduced, to 3,300 horses on average.140The Germans failed to use and distribute horses 
efficiently. One can only look at the Luftwaffe field divisions and the SS cavalry divisions to 
understand. Arguably, the strength of the 8th SS Cavalry Division (Florian Grey) reflected more 
not on the necessity of the horse, but of the power of the SS. The Luftwaffe divisions were “of 
little combat value” but took horsepower away from other divisions, perhaps in more need of 
them.141 
Further disaster was felt from the air, when potential aerial attacks could wipe horses 
completely out. Take the 275th infantry division as an example, which lost all of the horse-drawn 
transport and the vet company to Allied fighters in 1944. Up to 80,000 horses were lost in June 
of 1944, when Soviet motorized units overran the German infantry and panzer divisions.142 Apart 
from aerial attacks, horses, much like vehicles, presented a rather large obstacle on roads for 
oncoming infantry, horses, and vehicles to maneuver around.143  
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Across all fronts and operations, horses struggled to keep up with the demand and 
conditions of war, especially in the winter months in Russia. Horses were slaughtered and shot 
on the spot, although the meat went towards feeding hungry soldiers at times.144 
For practical reasons, such as supply trains following troops into various positions, horse-
drawn made sense.145 But there were many reasons in the end why horse-drawn supply trains 
were not as efficient as they could have been, if they were motorized. For example, rations for 
the horses took up valuable space in the supply train; four rations of oats and hay per animal 
could be divided amongst horses and vehicles.146 With additional horses, further space for feed 
was needed. 
The supply train of the German Army became excessively long, as the number of horses 
to meet the volume of which trucks could supply, was substantial. Comparing infantry divisions 
in East Prussia to divisions in Germany proper at the beginning of the war, East Prussian 
divisions had an additional 2,000 horses and 275 less trucks in their TOE.147 Assuming that their 
supply trains moved roughly the same amount, the East Prussians had more horses spread out 
over longer distances. Length of the trains would only increase upon acquisition of local horses 
and local carts. Interestingly, but unsurprisingly, these long trains exposed shortages even more 
evidently, and soldiers would hoard items as a result.148 Shortages were not always a result of the 
supply train, however. In one instance, the Fourth Army quartermaster connected the disposal of 
bailing wire with the inability to bale hay for the horses. Of course, this was once such 
observation alongside several others of carelessness or inattention to the care of the horses.149 
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 A final note on the supply train as it permitted to the care of horses; not only did 
feed being shipped to the front take up space in the railcars and wagons, but so did shipping 
horses. There was also the case of shipping goods back to Germany which took up space. This 
would include shipping horses back which were seeking medical care, as well as shipping 
manure back to be used as fertilizer.150  
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THE MOUNTED CAVALRY OF WORLD WAR II 
 
Organization 
The Treaty of Versailles dictated the German Army have roughly 16,400 troops mounted 
on horseback151 Until 1928, a cavalry regiment consisted of a regimental headquarters with a 
bugle corps, a signals platoon, four field troops, one replacement or training troop, and one 
heavy machine gun platoon (split into two half-platoons) with four s.MG.08s. A field troop 
consisted of 174 men and 200 horses while a training troop had 114 men and 170 horses. There 
were additional troops assigned to seven regiments, which were to serve under the infantry for 
reconnaissance. 154 men and 180 horses made up these divisional troops. Prior to military 
sovereignty, the Reichswehr had 97 cavalry troops. 152 
In 1934, the 11th, 12th, and 16th Horse Regiments were motorized into rifle regiments or 
motorcycle battalions. Other regiments saw the loss of entire troops, as men formed new tank, 
anti-tank, and armored reconnaissance units. The 4th and 7th became panzer regiments.153 This 
left 13 cavalry regiments for the Wehrmacht at the start of the war. By 1939 the army had grown 
from the original 10 divisions laid out by Versailles to an impressive 55 divisions. Fourteen of 
these division were fully motorized. 51 additional divisions were formed in the days and weeks 
following.154 
Each infantry division possessed around 4,700 horses, with each infantry regiment 
holding roughly 640 horses. Each division and subsequent regiment also included motorcycles 
 
151 Garson, p 9 
152 Richter, p10 
153 Richter, p12 
154 Richter, p9 
 McFarland 44 
and motor vehicles. A standard regiment would have 3,000 men, 55 motor vehicles, and 45 
motorcycles. The field army by 1939 consisted of roughly 514,000 horses.155 The 1st Cavalry 
Brigade had a strength of 4,200 horses for 6,200 men, and specifically consisted of two 
regiments, a mixed regiment, an artillery battalion, a mechanized reconnaissance battalion, and a 
bicycle battalion.156  
A horse regiment, which would be assigned under an army corps, had a strength of just 
over 1,000 horses, composed of riding horses, remounts, and draft horses.157 After 1935, an 
infantry horse platoon was assigned to each infantry regiment.158 
After 1939, the cavalry was essentially dissolved apart from the one standing division and 
divided amongst mounted reconnaissance sections and convoy escorts.159 Within this role 
included the signals divisions, part of whose task included laying telephone lines, an activity 
conducted via horseback.160 
 
The Waffen-SS 
The SS was originally a small troop of extremely loyal albeit arrogant soldiers, with 
disdain for the army and an unquestionable devotion to the Fuhrer.161 Led by Heinrich Himmler, 
the SS gained political and economic power, in addition to their military role. Initially, the SS’s 
reach included the Police, Gestapo, and concentration camps. The SS grew in size and power, 
recruiting men from all backgrounds in an effort to create a ‘classless’ structure in favor of an 
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overall elite force of men.162 Over the course of the war, the composition of the SS did indeed 
change, which created tension within the ranks. Himmler had to resort to acquiring men 
wherever he could, even if that meant acquiring “‘non-Germanic’ volunteers as cannon 
fodder.”163 This ‘Fourth Arm’ of the Wehrmacht, with its cruel men dressed in black, ended the 
war with involuntary recruits and a loss of its elite status which was so highly prized.164 The SS 
was in fact deemed a criminal organization at the Nuremburg trials, reflecting the radicalized and 
murderous attitudes of the ‘political soldiers’ it harbored.165 
In total, the Waffen-SS, which was brought up as Himmler’s army, was comprised of 38 
divisions (armored, infantry, mountain, cavalry), armored Police units, and the SS-
Totenkopfverbände or Death’s Head units. The SS considered cavalry “front-line troops” and 
appreciated the unique mobility advantages of horses.166 The SS -Totenkopf Reiterstandarte, the 
Deaths-Head Horse Regiment, was created specifically for partisan and security operations in 
Poland. Hermann Fegelein took command of this unit in November of 1939.167  
 Albert Schwenn’s account of his time as an SS cavalryman reflects quite a bit of bias in 
his unreliability and his deliberate omission of key events or experiences.168  In 1943, Schwenn 
was assigned to the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment and traveled to Yarzevo with the 5th Troop. He 
notes that early that year there was a shortage of NCOs. In the 2nd platoon, Schwenn and the 
machine gun crews would practice training, which included lying the horses down and target 
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practice. Schwenn offers an interesting observation when describing the gun crews; when 
dismounted, the gunners attended to the artillery, but someone had to hold the horses. While 
there were designated horse-holders in a machine gun crew, one must consider across the 
infantry and cavalry the waste of manpower designated to simply hold the horses during combat 
or breaks. 
 Even the Waffen-SS Cavalry was not exempt from restructuring and throughout the 
course of the war saw reorganizations and shuffling of men and horses. Notable horse units 
within the Waffen-SS included the 8th SS Cavalry Division ‘Florian Geyer,’ the 22nd SS 
Volunteer Cavalry Division ‘Maria Theresia,’ and the 37th SS Volunteer Cavalry Division 
‘Lützow.’169 
 
Equipment and Uniform 
Both horse and rider of the cavalry were issued equipment and a uniform.170 Both parties 
saw their equipment change, both in the interwar years and during the course of the war. While 
many soldiers took liberties in their uniform, with corrections or adjustments, what follows 
begins to describe the kit and outfit. 
 
Horse  
A working horse is typically outfitted with four steel horseshoes on trimmed feet. Legs 
can be bare, although modern sport-horses tend to have their legs bandaged or booted to avoid 
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injury. Basic riding equipment includes a saddle, a pad to be put between saddle and the back, a 
girth, and a bridle with bit and reins.171 
The leather saddle used by the German Army was known as the M25 or Army Saddle 25. 
The saddle came in five sizes, pertaining to the shape and size of the horse: the ribcage and the 
withers, specifically.172 The practice of different size ‘trees’ (the width of the channel beneath the 
seat) is both for the comfort of the horse and the rider. Tree sizing ensured the saddle was neither 
too wide nor too narrow, which would cause discomfort and sores. The saddle itself was fitted 
with hooks, straps, and reinforced leather. Each saddle would also have stirrup leathers, and steel 
stirrups which were polished or painted black.173  A girth would be secured under the belly to 
keep the saddle in place. 
In addition to the saddle, various saddle packs were used. Most well-known was the M34 
saddle bags which were a double set of packs to be placed adjacent to the saddle. One bag held 
supplies for the horse, while the other held the rider’s gear. The left bag could contain extra 
horseshoes and nails, a blanket strap, mess kit, brushes, a lead line, and a cleat tool. The right 
held personal belongings which might have included a tent rope, sewing kit, soap, razors, towel, 
underwear, swim trunks, shoes, rations, and more.174 Apart from saddle bags, a kit included a 
forage bag and a zeltbahn,175 a multipurpose bag used for carrying a blanket or grain. This was 
attached behind the saddle and rider.176 Near the end of the war, and used by the SS, a rear 
saddlebag was introduced, with a front weight to balance the saddle. 
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A standard bridle was used for the horse; This included a set or sets of leather reins 
attached to the metal bit.177 A noseband, crown piece, and throatlatch secured the bridle to the 
head. In some instances, a martingale (a leather loop around the neck with a perpendicular strap 
attached to the girth and noseband with the purpose of keeping the head from being thrown 
upright) was also worn. Halters were sometimes worn in addition to the bridle.178 
 
Rider  
Cavalrymen had a similar uniform to the infantry, but with a few key differences to 
accommodate to life in the saddle. The grey standard uniform was paired with riding boots that 
went up the knee with spurs buckled around the ankle of the boot. NCOs and enlisted men 
received a greatcoat of gray fabric, dubbed the “horse-blanket.”179 Cavalrymen wore full-seat 
breeches – riding pants with a leather “seat” from below the knees and up across the rear. The 
cavalrymen had the same pocket-less tunic issued in 1936 with distinct Brandenburg cuffs and 
cavalry-gold piping. Prior to the 1930s, the standard helmet, the “cavalry helmet,” had ear 
cutouts in the steel and possessed a wavy appearance from the side. This helmet was phased out 
with the standard M1935 helmet.180 The rider had no field pack as his infantry counterparts did. 
Instead, the “trooper pack” which doubled as a saddlebag, could be worn on the back and carried 
his tent. True cavalrymen also wore gold, whereas the infantry horsemen wore white, as a service 
color.181 
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For weaponry, the old Reichswehr horsemen were each assigned a Karabiner 98a, a 
bayonet, a saber, and a 3.2-meter steel lance.182 Later, the Karabiner 98b replaced the former 
rifle. The karabiner 98k eventually became the standard issue rife for the Wehrmacht, which was 
a shortened version of the M1898 Mauser rifle. This rifle was specifically designed for mounted 
troops.183 Officers of the cavalry carried Pistole 08s as their personal pistol and were outfitted 
with MP38 and eventually MP40s. The 08 was a 9mm semi-automatic known as the ‘Luger.’ 
This was later replaced by the P-38. The Sturmgewehr 44 also made an appearance.184 
Another rifle used was the Mauser 98k carbine. The k stood for kurz, meaning short. It 
was a 7.92mm bolt-action rifle with a five-round clip. The rifle was 1 meter long and weighed up 
to over 9 pounds. This was the Wehrmacht’s eventual standard issue rifle. For the cavalry, it was 
held in a scabbard on the left side of the trooper behind the leg and attached to the belt. 
Eventually, the cavalry transitioned to slinging the rifle across the back. After 1940, 
semiautomatics and machine-pistols were added to the arsenal.185 
In terms of steel, issued until 1941, the M1916 saber had a blade of thirty inches and 
rested behind the saddle when mounted.186 Later, a bayonet of fifteen and one quarter inches 
attached to the frog of the saber was added. 
The original weapons, rather unique to the cavalry and effectively used at high speeds, 
was the lance and sword. The ten-and-a-half-foot lance itself was issued to German cavalrymen 
up until 1927.187As firearm technology improved, and indeed cavalrymen began training and 
using rifles, the use of steel arguably was becoming just as obsolete as the cavalry. Linked to the 
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romanticism of the cavalry, and the terror induced from flashing steel combined with a charging 
animal, steel still had supporters, from prominent military leaders as General Patton, as well as 
the European patricians, such as Austrian count Gustav Wrangel. The Cavalry Training Manual 
of the British Army, published in 1907, held that the rifle could never replace the full project 
involving steel, horses, and the charge. One can argue that the sentiment expressed by many at 
the turn of the century was a matter of principle and tradition, rather than facts. It is interesting to 
note that as the sword and lance fell out of favor, rather due to lack of use and efficiency, the 
bayonet, another form of steel, saw increasing use and prominence on the battlefield. Of course, 
the bayonet was to be used in a more intimate setting than the lance, but the general concept of 
steel being used in war is a testament to the metal’s longevity as a weapon.188 
 
Cavalry Training and the Remount Program 
General Hans von Seeckt189 had a continuing interest in the cavalry, and, having served 
on the Eastern Front in World War I, understood and appreciated the horse’s contribution to the 
mobility of forces. Seeckt was responsible for reorganizing Germany’s cavalry from the Treaty 
of Versailles, grouping two regiments into three brigades under each division. The number of 
divisions and regiments stayed the same, but Seeckt shuffled the organization, as well as adding 
horse-drawn guns and enlarging the machine gun section to a company. Seeckt added units not 
only to the cavalry divisions, but to the divisional headquarters as well, believing that 
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improvements to the technical aspects of the cavalry would increase their power and strength on 
the battlefield and keep the cavalry as a relevant and potent force in the German army.190 
Mobility was the cavalry’s strength that arguably kept mounted-troops relevant. While 
armored cars, tanks, bicycles, and motorcycles were certainly mobile, horses continued to prove 
their unique versatility as they could cover ground inaccessible to wheeled vehicles, and even 
were occasionally needed to rescue those vehicles broken down or stuck.191 
The major difference which separated cavalrymen and mounted infantry was, essentially, 
horsemanship.192 While both could be trained in combat, rifles, artillery, and more, it was really 
only and truly a horseman who could ride and care for his mount the way he deserved.  
As per the Treaty of Versailles, soldiers had a twelve-year enlistment commitment to 
serve. Prior to 1935, a cavalryman would receive around 3,000 hours of training in the saddle 
over the course of those twelve years, to ensure proper equitation and riding skills were 
developed. Large-scale river crossings were also to be conducted at least once per year. Troopers 
had the opportunity to be awarded the Horseman’s Badge in gold, silver, or bronze, reflecting 
their riding skill and theoretical knowledge. Surprisingly, many members of the cavalry did not 
earn this badge, although Rittmeisters and Hauptmanns (captains) were expected to pass.193 
Although by the 1920s the idea of the charge as a means for a cavalry attack had all but 
lost its luster, formation riding was still an essential part of training, supplementing equitation. A 
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double column replaced the regimental column as the standard column. Along with the platoon 
column (an even narrower formation), these column formations limited the front of the column 
to as little as fifteen feet across. This reduced front aided the cavalry on the march and allowed 
mounted troops to tackle topographically difficult terrain as well as access otherwise restricted 
terrain.194 In the case of forested paths, a narrower formation was essential to travel. Utilizing 
such paths, cavalry found themselves sheltered from aerial attack and enemy fire. The double 
column formation was continued into World War II.195 Apart from formational riding, cavalry 
continued to ride in screening and reconnaissance detachments, which served to aid the infantry. 
The army’s major exercises of the mid-1920s included the cavalry with mock tanks, 
mobile artillery, and machine guns. In a sense, this was the field test, combining mobility with 
fire power as envisioned by General Seeckt. The result of these exercises, however, was the 
cavalry reinforcing their role as assisting the infantry. After 1933, the cavalry was cut down to 
squadron-size, assigned to infantry divisions, and to be delegate to the task of reconnaissance. 196 
For the traditional German cavalryman, over 3,000 hours in the saddle comprised their 
training. After 1935, however, this number fell drastically as men would spend about an hour in 
the saddle each day.197 This decrease in training was not unique to the cavalry; in order to keep 
up with replacing great numbers of casualties, training and enculturation were all shortened.198 
The remainder of their training turned to weaponry and combat. In regard to signal training and 
communication, the Wehrmacht used twenty-five different hand signals to communicate with 
one another while riding/in motion.199 
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Training involved group riding, taking jumps at a canter or gallop,200 riding through splits 
in the trees, and jumping narrow gates.201  Riders would also be skilled in vaulting exercises,202 
fast mounting and dismounting, and firing while standing in the saddle. In regard to that 
particular feat, it was considered “unlikely to occur…[but] it demonstrate[s] the perfect 
obedience of the horse and the rider’s excellent training.”203 Horses were also trained to lay on 
the ground, to provide cover for their riders and cover for themselves.204 Additionally, extra 
precautions were taken to protect horses from enemy fire: protecting the soldiers extended to 
protecting their mounts as well.205 
Hand in hand with horsemanship was being able to care for the animal. Riders and 
drivers were trained in basic needs, including medical. This was in conjunction with the 
veterinary and blacksmiths schools across the Reich which supplied men for those purposes. 
 
Equestrian Games 
 Before 1952, equestrian events and competition were restricted for military males, as the 
events were an avenue to showcase calvary training.206 The International Military Horse Show 
was one such venue in which European cavalrymen would come together to compete. In the 
jumping event, high jumps would be taken at speed, and other obstacles, such as a raised bank, 
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would be present.207 The Olympic games was another; the 1936 games were held in Berlin, 
Germany, and was absolutely dominated by the Germans who took home all three gold medals. 
Horse racing was another notable sport undertaken by the Wehrmacht. Each battalion or 
regiment would have their own silk pattern, resulting in 38 different racing colors. Fox hunting 
was also popular, as it was adjunct to battlefield skills.208 
 
The Remount System 
Supplying horses for the army required a large number of animals before combat, and 
then maintaining a constant stream of replacements. In preparing for war and her expansion, the 
German Army relied on foreign purchases of horses, in addition to established remount 
programs. These purchases would either supply cavalry horses or support horses. In the 1930s, 
Germany bought many of the British Army’s horses when the units motorized. Another large 
grouping of animals came from Hungary.209 
To keep up with the demand for horses lost, either due to age during peacetime or disease 
and death in war, the Germans had a well-established remount program. The German Army 
relied on local horses and commercially employed horses to serve as remounts during the war. 
For an expedited training process but also in the name of efficiency, horses within the nation 
must have been adequate and suitable cavalry mounts. This thinking is part of the reason why the 
government and state influenced horse breeding within Germany to satisfy the army in war and 
in peacetime.  
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Before World War II, Germany purchased horses at remount markets. The Inspectorate of 
Riding and Driving was responsible for authorizing these purchases, as well as observing the 
overall management of army horses. Under the pre-war system, horses were purchased at the age 
of three and spent a year conditioning. At age four, specific intensive training began.210 Training 
lasted until the horse was six.211 It is important to note that horses are slow developers and do not 
fully mature until the age of six. Not all remounts were used or bought. This was in part due to 
farmers or citizens bringing either older horses or unfit horses to market, such as stallions.212  
To secure horses during the war, the Germans employed three methods: requisitioning, 
purchasing, and hiring. Purchasing involved horses being brought to a town’s headquarters in 
specific numbers and were paid for at established prices. Farmers, along with their horses and 
wagons, were employed by the German Army which enabled the use of the horse but prevented a 
hungry farmer from joining the partisans in opposition.213 
In addition to having state sponsored studs, the Germans also required every animal to be 
listed in a registry, thus considering commercial horses for military use if the need arose. 
Germany employed a pre-war program in which every horse in the nation were registered by the 
Inspectorate of Conscription and Recruiting. This system proved vital in securing suitable horses 
for the Army’s need. 
In occupied territories, Germany employed similar measures to procure horses in that all 
the horses in a region were not taken as to preserve economic life and agricultural production. 
When economies were less developed, more horses were taken, as densely populated regions 
would have felt the loss in animal life substantially more. The reasons for this were clear in the 
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Russian campaign, where the loss of the local panje horses would perhaps spur the local 
population to join the partisan groups the Germans were so desperate to rid themselves of. Also, 
requisitioned horses could carry diseases which would be spread amongst the combat ready 
horses, without adequate quarantine and integration. Headquarters was responsible for horse 
requirements, as they were able to the numbers at more of an executive level. Only in desperate 
times would individual units seek out horses in unconventional manners.214 
Russia is a prime example of requisitioning gone wrong, as mistakes were made when 
selecting horses to fill open mount positions. Mistakes would include horses that were too large a 
horse, or too old, too immature, or even a valuable stud. Pregnant mares could not work, and 
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SELECT CAMPAIGNS OF WORLD WAR II 
  
This section deals with a few select campaigns from World War II, primarily focusing on 
operations in which cavalry had a role, or the use of the horse proved significant. Of course, an 
argument could be made that the role of the horse was critical in all major infantry216 operations. 
However, this selection is not all inclusive and serves to highlight major operations or events. 
 
Polish Campaign, 1939-1941 
The Second World War broke out on the morning of September 1, 1939 when Adolf 
Hitler’s Wehrmacht invaded Poland. Two army groups pushed on into Poland, Army Group 
North and Army Group South.217 
The cavalry was involved from the start: The 1st Cavalry Brigade protected the eastern 
flank of the 3rd Army as they advanced into Poland. Separately, the 1st Mounted Regiment was 
positioned in the Fürstenwalde forest, with orders to attack Mysienice. The 2nd Mounted 
Regiment was to follow, positioned to the east. By the afternoon, the Polish 18th Uhlan Regiment 
of the Pomorska cavalry Brigade was engaged in the first cavalry attack of World War II against 
the Germans. The cavalry attack was ordered to enable Polish infantry to retreat. By early 
evening, the Polish cavalry had regrouped and began the first cavalry charge of World War II 
from the woods near Krojanty. 1st Squadron led, with sabers pointed and soldiers low on horses’ 
necks. 2nd Squadron joined to create a mass of 250 men and horses charging at German infantry. 
In the adrenaline of the charge, the Polish cavalry failed to notice a column of motor vehicles and 
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tanks arrive. What resulted was a massacre, a mess of horse and rider at the mercy of German 
steel.218 
While the Polish cavalry charge inspired an inaccurate myth and legend of the Uhlans 
charging the German tanks, the moral and hope the charge inspired would only have been 
reinforced by the 10th Uhlan Regiment of the Podlaska Cavalry Brigade advancing across the 
German border into East Prussia.219 Along with the Polish 9th Mounted Light Infantry and the 5th 
Uhlans, the Poles were repulsed by German artillery fire and trenched bunkers.220 
The 1st Cavalry Brigade saw further action during the first week of September. They were 
met with night attacks along the roads connecting the Polish towns of Rozan, Pultusk, and 
Ostrow Mazowiecki. The day-time attack on September 7th, in which the Polish singled in on the 
1st Mounted Regiment and attacked the horses at the rear, had the Germans so shook, that secret 
papers were burned as to keep them out of Polish hands.221 Apart from the sneaky movements of 
the Polish infantry, the Polish cavalry proved to be quite adept at combatting the Germans. Not 
only had the Uhlans utilized their lances in a successful manner, but the “small cavalry units 
flushed out enemy forces” and were met with little resistance.222 Although the “desperate 
courage” of the Polish cavalry could be viewed as admirable and a testament to the 
traditionalism of the mounted forces, in the end they were no match for the Germans. An 
unfortunate event for the Poles occurred on the night of September 11th, when the cavalry 
mistook an order meant for scouts as an order to charge on the German-occupied Kaluszyn. 
Opposing Panzers with sabers, it is little surprise that 33 of the 85 Polish horses returned.223 
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The first few weeks in Poland for the cavalry and mounted units were a series of late 
nights, burning villages, and harrowing encounters with the enemy, on both sides. One morning 
during the second week of the campaign, the reconnaissance unit of the German 14th Army 
awoke to discover they had spent the night right under the noses of a Polish cavalry regiment.224 
The Polish campaign is an excellent example of perhaps some of the more testing 
experiences a horse and rider might go through together. A German scout noted on a patrol that 
“[the riders] were scared that the horses might take fright” at the burning villages they rode past, 
or even worse, that the “horses might catch fire.”225 The Poles experienced the influence of the 
herd dynamic or mentality when approaching German-occupied Czeczotki. Galloping into 
artillery fire, “the horses were tired, the pitch of nervous tension induced the weaker beasts to 
keep up the tempo and the entire cavalcade careered directly at the screen of fire.”226 Certainly 
the campaign was taxing on all involved, however the horses were pushed to their limits, 
physically, and asked to ride straight into what could only have looked like hell to them, with fire 
and noise and the earth opening in front of them as they charged. 
The German 1st Cavalry Brigade’s offensive role in the Polish Campaign, according to 
the words of one author, came to an end on September 21st, when they took up defense of the 
Army Corps on the path to Warsaw.227 However, one last great cavalry battle between the 
Germans and the Polish was still yet to happen. On September 23rd, the German cavalry was 
surprised by a force of Uhlans, who rode through the morning mist with steel lances glinting and 
the roar of their battle cry surely cutting across the field in a bone-chilling manner. Near the town 
of Krasnobrod, the German cavalrymen rode down a hill, sabers drawn, to meet the opposing 
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cavalrymen. The end result was a German victory, and striking losses for the Uhlans.228 While 
this battle was cavalry versus cavalry, the losses were arguably more devastating due to the 
incorporation of firearms alongside sabers and lances. In this instance, bullets took the lives of 
both horses and men. 
As for concluding the Polish campaign, Warsaw was taken on September 27, 1939, just 
ten days after the Soviets invaded Poland. While the Germans altogether did not lose many men, 
nearly a quarter of the tanks used were lost, reflecting just a portion of their equipment losses.229 
Once Poland was under German occupation and Warsaw had been taken, the Waffen-SS 
cavalry had the duty to conduct ‘mopping up’ of partisan activity – an assignment for which the 
Berittene Abteilung was specifically created.230 Controlling partisan activity involved search and 
seizures of weapons, hunting for partisans, and protecting the Volksdeutche, or ethnic Germans. 
Here the SS’s duties were primarily policing and security, enforcing laws and handling 
deportation of Polish prisoners to work camps. Of course, the punishment was doled out both 
informally and formally; any sign of resistance and the offender would be shot.231 In more than 
one instance, groups of prisoners, were executed by the SS, although the reasons vary.232 
The SS remained in Poland233 to continue with partisan duty and security as the war 
advanced elsewhere. The ‘Florian Geyer’ division was originally formed from the original 
brigade in June of 1942, and after some front-line action returned to the marshes. In December of 
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1944, after having seen growth over the previous years, ‘Florian Geyer’ was sent to Budapest 
where the soldiers met their demise.234 
Being a rider, Albert Schwenn’s account offers another insight to the inefficiency and 
perhaps degradation felt by the cavalry. He describes one day during the invasion into Reich 
Commissariat Ukraine, RKU, when the troops awoke early in the morning and rode for a few 
miles before “[leading] our horses for three miles, as they had to be spared.”235 Of course, the 
motorized units in the Kfz15s quickly overtook the cavalry early in the morning. 
 In RKU, Schwenn operated in the infamous Wet Triangle, which lay between the Pripyat 
and Dnieper rivers. Here in the Pripyat Marshes, Schwenn conducted Operation Vistula I, and 
swept for partisans. He described seizing livestock to deprive the partisans of food and burning 
villages. The reconnaissance rides were met with bullets, and even abandoned villages were set 
with booby traps to catch the SS soldiers.236 
 In stark contrast to patrolling for partisans and sweeping villages, Schwenn described an 
event in which the soldiers played tricks on the other units, despite “the hardship” experienced in 
war. In one instance, the soldiers rode their unsaddled horses in nothing but bathing trunks at 
speed through the forest, imitating “cowboys, screeching and shouting” to frighten other units.237 
It is curious to see the horses incorporated into more of the personal lives of the soldiers in this 
way. Of course, Schwenn “loved [his] horse but [he] would gladly have given him up for a place 
in an assault gun.”238 
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The Western Front, 1940 
 After the invasion of Poland, before the war took the west, the Germans looked at the 
Nordic countries. Although the seaborne landing in Norway was successful, heavy naval losses 
handicapped the Germans, which was evident later on, upon anticipating facing Britain. Half of 
Germany’s destroyers were lost, almost a third of her cruisers, and other ships suffered heavy 
damage as well.239 
After Poland and Norway, the Nazi war machine was turned toward the West. The 
campaign was initially delayed from its original November 1939 date, and the invasion plan was 
further drastically revised upon the original falling into the hands of the Allies.240 Much of this 
revision included debate on panzer unit positioning. Although successful in the Polish Campaign, 
the inferiority of the Polish equipment and arms called into question the effectiveness of the 
tanks. Were tanks and their strategy actually successful or was it chance and luck that allowed 
the armored vehicles to penetrate so successfully into Polish territory?241 On May 10, 1940, 
German troops attacked the West via land and air with 136 divisions sweeping into and over 
Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland; three neutral countries toward which Hitler had previously 
vowed to honor that said neutrality.242 The success of these strikes came not from the size of the 
German forces, but rather the calculated and precise attacks by aircraft and panzers. This 
continued to be the successful strategic deployment of German mechanized forces, and only 
supported the propaganda of a war machine. Seven concentrated tank divisions breaking through 
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a weak point in the line, supplemented by air attacks and airborne troops, moved fast and 
effectively into Western Europe.243 
The horse was ideally suited for the Eastern campaign, as the Germans would encounter, 
or at least prepared for, unpaved roads, questionable soil, and great distances for supply chain 
and advancement.244 Specifically in Holland, the cavalry was well adept to cross and conquer the 
numerous dykes and waterways, although advancement was slow. The 1st Mounted Regiment of 
the 1st Cavalry Division, attached to the 18th Army, had orders to break through the Dutch 
frontier and proceed to the coast.245 Within the first 20 minutes of their campaign on the 10th of 
May, the cavalry had advanced almost 3km into Holland. By the second day, German cavalry 
had ridden approximately 180km over terrain almost impassable to motor vehicles.246 
The first Germans to cross the Seine River in France happened to be the cavalry 
reconnaissance squadron of the 6th Infantry Division, under the leadership of Lieutenant von 
Boeselager.247 June 9 was the day the cavalry’s water training was put to the test, as twelve 
soldiers held their magazines in their mouths, rode their horses into the French water, and held 
mane and reins as the current swirled around them. Fire was exchanged across the banks, but the 
Germans remounted and rode their horses up the bank, successfully bringing Germany into 
France.248 
The 1st Cavalry Brigade had been expanded to a division in time for combat on the 
Western Front and served both in Belgium and in France. After Holland, they were assigned to 
the 38th Army Corps. Part of their assignment were to send reconnaissance riders or scouts ahead 
 
243 Ibid, p200 
244 Johnson, p9 
245 Piekałkiewicz, p27 
246 Ibid, p28 
247 Ibid, p30 
248 Ibid, p30 
 McFarland 64 
of the infantry on their way to Paris.249 Their other duty was to protect the left flank of the corps. 
In a particularly untoward event, when the corps were positioned near Meulen, the French sent 
horses out into the fields approaching the Germans. These horses were riderless, and the fields 
were actually littered with mines.250 What resulted was a carnage of horseflesh, and a rather 
gruesome example of the horse being used as an asset and victim of war. 
The German cavalry division attempted to cross the Loire on June 19, but were met by 
the cadets of the famous calvary school at Saumur, an establishment boasting the equestrian 
educations of the notable figures of General Patton and Charles de Gaulle.251 For two days, the 
bridges were blown, and the French and Germans squared off across the river. The cadets were 
defeated when the fighting concluded in hand-to-hand combat, and the Germans advanced across 
the Loire river.252 
 
The Battle of Britain and Operation Sealion 
 Upon the surrender of France,253 the next hurdle in Hitler’s war would be Great Britain. 
Churchill’s refusal to enter into a peace agreement prompted Hitler to order an aerial attack, 
which would then clear the way for an invasion.254 The Battle of Britain was the result of these 
air attacks and ultimately Britain emerged victorious. Here the naval losses were significantly 
felt as the invasion had hinged upon success in the air, whereas the proposed land attack, 
Operation Sealion, would have followed. Thus, Operation Sealion was the operation fated never 
to be. The proposed land assault of Great Britain would require sea transport for soldiers and the 
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numerous horses Germany planned to take over, before acquiring British vehicles. It was 
anticipated that the first wave of Sealion would require 4,200 horses, and a second wave of 
7,000.255 Not only would transporting the horses across the Channel require immense 
preparation, resources, and time, but also training the horses to load into ships and keep calm and 
uninjured while sailing. In the end, Operation Sealion never came to fruition, although the sea-
training for horses had begun in anticipation.256 
 
Operation Barbarossa and the Eastern Front, 1941-1945 
The German Army invaded Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941. The initial invasion 
employed 750,000 horses, although a majority of these were for artillery or as pack horses.257 
Germany and her allies – a strength of 3.5 million men and 153 German divisions – quickly took 
the front which stretched between the Baltic and Black Seas. So quickly did the Germans 
advance to the front, that both cavalry and infantry had to leave exhausted horses behind and 
continue on foot.258 Entering Russia, the infantry divisions each employed 4,842 horses and 918 
horse-drawn transport vehicles.259 Operation Barbarossa placed the 1st Cavalry Division with the 
24th Motorized Corps of the 2nd Panzer Group of Army Group Centre.260 The 1st and 2nd Cavalry 
Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division were the first to cross the River Bug early in the morning. 
By June 23, the cavalry was in Russia, on full alert for the anticipated onslaught of tanks. Losses 
and panic abounded when Soviet planes attacked from the sky; cavalry and horse-artillery were 
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attacked with no cover in the Russian marshes. Riders crashed into each other as panicked horses 
caused the columns to lose formation, some torn from their saddles in the midst.261  
The Germans would face not only Russian tanks and planes, but also the Russian calvary, 
which proved to be an intense force. The Cossacks Squadrons were formed within the cover of 
darkness, in dense forests. The cavalry units, under the command of General Lev Mikhailovich 
Dovator were able to disrupt German communications during the early weeks of the 
campaign.262 
Commanding the SS Cavalry, Hermann Fegelein sought to insert and reaffirm 
specifically the SS Cavalry’s role in Russia. He aggressive attempted to position them in a role 
of importance, to the point of exaggeration, as when amplified the calvary’s appearance during 
the first combat of the campaign.263 In reality, the cavalry of the SS and the Wehrmacht 
performed both offensive and defensive roles, in pursuing Soviet forces but also engaging in 
combat.264 The 1st Cavalry Division found themselves once again occupying an area known as 
the Pripet Marshes, a wetland stretching over two hundred miles east to west and occupying over 
100,000 square miles. The marshes were an interesting land area, with dry and wet areas, rivers 
and basins, as well as forest and dense habitat suited for boar, wolves, fowl, insects, and 
partisans of Soviet and Polish nationality.265 Operations in this area were a continuation from the 
Polish Campaign. The SS Cavalry Brigade encompassed the 1st and 2nd Calvary Regiments, were 
also occupying the Pripet Marshes around the same time as the Wehrmacht’s cavalry.266 It was 
here in the marshes in which the SS cavalry later took part in the gruesome mass killings of 
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Jews.267 The first of such missions, on August 6, 1941, the SS cavalrymen inititated in the 
massacre at Pinsk. The exact number of Jews murdered over the course of a few days is 
estimated between 7,000 and 9,000, if not more.268 Further examination of the SS cavalry 
operations in the marshes and in Russia is necessary as this is perhaps the greatest significance of 
the cavalry’s role during the Second World War. Additionally, the SS cavalry’s decision to 
execute other groups of victims has been linked to an escalation of the Holocaust, due to the 
sheer excess and brutality of the SS cavalrymen, specifically.269 
The Germans as a whole began to encounter issues as early as August, when the cold was 
enough to crave the greatcoat at times.270 The muddy season began in September, when the rains 
created a muck that even the most formidable German draught horses could not conquer. 271  The 
snows started in October, and the biting winds and following rain created a hinderance to 
German operations.272 The issue of fodder for the horses became a real issue in Russia, when the 
lack of feed stockpiles and inadequate local options caused horse to “[die] en masse,” and 
starvation drove the animals to consume just about anything, from sawdust to saplings.273 
Not just limited to the Germans, other nations utilized horses in the Second World War, 
with disastrous consequences as well. War never ceases to create unparalleled events of tragedy 
and horror. For the horse, a deeply unsettling event occurred on the shores of Lake Ladoga. In 
the forests surrounding the lake the Russians and the Finnish were in opposition. The Finnish 
cavalry assisted the VI and VII Army Corps and surrounded Russian troops in October of 1941. 
The forest was set ablaze, and the Finnish determinedly began firing into the burning trees. 
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Thousands of horses, driven on by pain and fear, tore through the burning trees and blaze of 
ammunition. Horses burned to death on the banks and those lucky enough to dive into the icy 
waters of the lake were frozen to death, entombed in ice.274 
Rain and wind soon turned to snow and ice, and left the Germans battling an 
unprecedented cold.275 Here, the hardy panje horses with their thick coats served another purpose 
than pulling the ‘homemade’ Russian sleds. A soldier on the Western Front, Guy Sajer, 
described hanging onto a horse’s harness, his hands buried in its thick fur.276At night, horses 
were made to lie down, just to provide warmth for the freezing soldiers. Frost bite and 
pneumonia ravaged the troops, and some saw their last days in the icy desert, by their hand or by 
nature’s, in the Russian tundra.277 
The winter took many lives, four-legged or otherwise. As harsh as the ice and snow was, 
the real struggle came about when the snow gave way to sludge and mud. Not only did the 
appearance of ground mean the loss of sleds and the emergence of wagons, but the horses 
struggled with adjusting to life once again with fodder available. Just as a man left alone with 
meek rations will quiver in sickness at the reintroduction of steak to his diet, did the horse 
struggle with the addition of grain following the winter months.278 
These winter conditions, coupled with an ongoing fuel shortage, left many vehicles out of 
commission or use by the German Army. This is where horses filled in the gaps, when vehicles 
were moved to areas of more prominent need.279 To meet the constant need for vehicles 
Germany set up maintenance facilities and increased part production. However, considering the 
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large number of vehicle models, this proved to be a difficult project. Coupled with the “long 
overland supply routes,” there was an “excessive strain” on vehicles on the Eastern Front.280 
German High Command disbanded the cavalry on November 5, 1941.281 Straight from 
the Fuhrer, whose contempt for the cavalry surfaces in few writings282, the command converted 
the calvary into the 24th Armored Division and sentenced the horses, whose breeding and 
training dictated highly trained and valuable animals, to pull wagons and artillery.283 The use of 
mounted units continued, however, such as in quiet sectors in the East, which were easier to be 
captured by horse, rather than vehicle. Partisan control and smaller operations also called for 
horses.284 
While the use of mounted units declined following this announcement, horses were still a 
vital and integral part of the supply chain and artillery movement. By mid-November, 85% of the 
500,000 vehicles that entered Russia were no longer in use.285 Horse-drawn supply trains are 
most effective covering short distances, but the Russian campaign forced horses to being used in 
the rear of the trains. Covering long distances necessitated the creation of a relay system.286 
Arguably an efficient solution to the problem of distance in the case of supply train, the Germans 
were not free from failure in the use of horses. In the fall of 1942, the 6th Army made the 
decision to send most of its horses to the rear. The remaining horses were then eaten, to provide 
food for the trapped and starving soldiers.287 When the army found itself in retreat of Stalingrad, 
there were not enough horses to pull the artillery and wagons.288 
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In regard to Eastern Front operations, it is important to note that members of the 
equestrian tribes of Cossacks and Calmucks, while originally fighting for Soviet Russia, 
eventually switched sides to fight for the Germans.289 This began as early as 1941, when in the 
fall, Cossack volunteers faced off against Soviet partisans.290 
 
The Revival of the Cavalry 
 The German cavalry units were revived when von Boeselager, the same man who crossed 
the Seine, bent the ear of Field-Marshal von Kluge and was allowed to form the Boeselager 
Mounted Force. Although difficult to pry men away from the soldier hungry infantry, by 
February 1943 von Boeselager had acquired his horses and he had his men as well, including 
some Cossack recruits.291 The German cavalry was officially back. By April, it was officially 
designated the Cavalry Regiment (Center) and this addition then spurred the creation of Cavalry 
Regiment (North) and (South).292 The primary duty of these new regiments was once again 
partisan patrol. 
 
The Slaughter of the Horses 
 In January 1944, the Germans descended upon Novgorod to capture the Danube Line 
unsuccessfully.293 Cavalry Regiment (North) deployed three squadrons, which all suffered 
considerable losses. Soon after the capture, they were ordered to evacuate.294 Similar situations 
occurred across the Crimean Peninsula, where a series of strongholds were evacuated.  
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While the newly formed cavalry regiments proved to be useful and essential on the 
Eastern front, tragedy was creeping up on the Germans. When the Germans evacuated Crimea in 
May of 1944, they had a big problem – a 30,000 strong problem. The men, many of which could 
not do the deed himself, led his horse to one of the vets who shot the animal before pushing the 
body over the cliff and into the Bay of Severnaya. The purpose of this execution was to prevent 
the animals from being acquired by the advancing Soviets.295 Of course, the system was quickly 
proven too slow, as horses being held began to get agitated. In what could have only been 
described as chaos and lawlessness, the horses were driven to the cliff’s edge and mowed down 
by machine guns.296 
 In this unsurpassed moment of terror, a heartbreaking farewell to a loyal mount captures 
what can only be described as true sorrow and grief: 
“I had to hide behind a mask of anger, so as not to seem too tender-hearted. But I 
had to be alone to say farewell to my Paprika. She looked at me with those 
enormous eyes which always seemed to convey a feeling of melancholy. She 
nuzzled her head against my chest and finally laid it in her favorite position, on 
my shoulder…. We loved each other, we really did, Paprika, and the whole 
company knew it…. I never told you, Paprika, that I wanted to buy you a happy 
retirement after the war and had already found you a place to live in Berlin with 
some good people. But now we must go our separate ways, torn asunder by the 
merciless fortunes of war.”297 
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Tanks on the Eastern Front 
German Panzer Commander Otto Carius described his time during the war from the 
perspective of his tank. His memoirs offer a different perspective to the life of the cavalrymen, 
and the plight faced by the horses. In particular, Carius described two interesting supply issues, 
one in which field bakeries were held up at the rear, implying both a supply chain delay but also 
the difficulty in which soldiers acquired food at the front. Furthermore, the soldiers were 
instructed not to drink water from wells, as there was great potential that they would be 
poisoned. Instead, at halts, they would look for puddles from which to drink.298 Poisoned water 
supplies would indeed threaten an entire infantry or cavalry division, affecting both man and 
horse. 
 Carius’s memoir offers a unique take on the terrain over which the German Army 
traveled. Panzer drivers had to be extremely skilled and have an instinct for the ground beneath 
his tracks. He described the frozen ground in Leningrad, and the sheer impossibility of leaving 
the road, causing great traffic jams and further delays. Marshes were a cause to abandon the 
tanks, which were subsequentially burned as to be kept out of enemy hands.  Along the 
Rollbahn, they were constrained to traveling at night, and Carius notes for the “slow, horse-
drawn units, it was practically impossible to move forward.”299 
 Russia was a test of the human body and the spirit; “inhuman conditions” matched with 
sheer inexperience and unpreparedness of the German Army for the cold winter left men in states 
of starvation, depression, and frigid numbness. Of course, Carius was adamant that the spirit of 
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the Germans was showcased quite positively in this campaign, due to the continued performance 
and success of the army.300 
 No matter how motorized certain divisions came to be, or how propaganda painted a 
picture of mechanized power, horses were prevalent throughout the army. Case and point, 
Carius, huddled in a metal tank, encountered horses at various stages. During the Russian 
campaign, Carius wrote of a mounted messenger who approached his tank, which was driven 
slowly as to not frighten the animal. The horse, young and panicky, was unfortunately caught 
under the tank. The body was recovered quickly though and found its way into the soldier’s 
rations.301 Sajer described a similar experience, viewing an animal strung up in a tree, being 
transformed into rations.302  
 Tanks, or the armored cavalry, retained similar characteristics to that of their 
predecessors. When ordered to leave their tanks, drivers had difficulty, much as riders would 
struggle with leaving their mounts behind.303 Many tank officers did come from the cavalry, and 
perhaps felt somewhat at home with large maneuvers and spacing, which was needed when 
working with horses.304 
 
Operation Spring Awakening and the End of the War 
The cavalry saw a great reorganization in the summer of 1944. The 1st Cavalry 
Corps, also known as the Harteneck Cavalry Corps, combined the German cavalry with 
the 1st Hungarian Cavalry. This addition of the hussars spurred similar situations as the 
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Cossacks; namely, the Hussars refused certain orders, such as opposing Polish partisans, 
and they proved fierce and effective on the battlefield, a homage to their tradition as a 
horse people.305  
 In the final months of the war, the Cossack cavalry units saw combat in the Papuk 
mountains in Yugoslavia against the Red Army. On May 8th the Cossacks received orders 
to suspend operations and thus turned towards the advancing British Army, in an attempt 
to provide their services. However, the British, removing their weapons, turned them 
back over to the Russians.306 
The 4th German Cavalry was sent to Hungary in December 1944, in an attempt to 
rescue the German and Hungarian forces which were under fire from the Russians. By 
May 8, 1945, with the surrender of Germany, the 4th Cavalry was still in Hungary, near 
Knittelfeld. The original operation had failed, and so the cavalry went west, moving 
16,000 horses and 22,000 men towards the British forces. The German Cavalry saw its 
last days in the Mur Valley, and by May 11, 1946, the cavalry ceased to exist.307  
  
 
305 Piekałkiewicz, p229 
306 Ibid, p235-236 
307 Ibid, p236 
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THE HORSE BEYOND COMBAT 
 
Psychotherapy 
The reaction of men to the horrors and stress of war manifests itself in what the German 
Army during World War I categorized as nervously ill or mentally ill. Miraculously cured during 
the interwar period, the Germans entered World War II still unfamiliar with the concept of 
combat fatigue. In the early campaigns, which were intense albeit limited in duration, psychiatric 
cases were limited. However, once the German Army advanced on Russia, war-induced neurosis 
sent many men to the psychiatrists, as psychoneurosis was considered to be psychiatric cases.308 
“Battle neurotics” however were considered a sign of weakness and troops were subsequentially 
punished.309 
About one-third of war-induced neurosis cases were considered purely psychiatric; the 
rest of the cases were in conjunction with physical wounds or thought to be neurological or 
resulting from contusions in action. Treatment primarily took place in field hospitals, where after 
a period of recovery, most patients returned to their units. Soldiers who did not respond to field 
treatment, which was a combination of sedation and verbal assurance, were sent to military 
hospitals or Kriegslazaret. Military hospitals employed electric current therapy, hypnosis, and 
cardiozol dosing. Here, the suggestion of pain was thought to be an effective method of 
treatment. Roughly 85% of cases returned to their units after a stay in the military hospital. 
 
308 Van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945. (Praeger Publishers, 
1982.) p 91 
309 Müller, p84 
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Soldiers who did not return home, and further failed remote treatment, were put in mental 
institutions.310 
Ernst Göring, the nephew of Herman Göring, was not only training to practice 
psychotherapy but was a horseman. He trained with the SA Riding Corps and discovered, as 
many horsemen do, that riding helped with managing his stress. Combined with his previous 
experience and knowledge in gymnastics, Göring created ‘riding therapy’ as a means to use 
horses in rehabilitation programs. Göring was in charge of the Luftwaffe hospital’s 
psychotherapy war in Brunswick in 1940. Into 1941, Göring used horses to help ‘flown-out’ 
Luftwaffe pilots regain strength and the ability to mount – both horses and their eventual 
Messerschmitt Bf 110s. By 1942, however, Göring relinquished the program to work on the 




 The manner of breeding horses specifically suited for war was not a new concept 
introduced by the Germans. As mentioned, the German State Stud farms had all been long 
established by the 20th century, with tenured breeding operations and renowned horseflesh. In a 
country reliant upon large numbers of horses for the economy but also for military, the breeding 
of horses was an important business.  
 
310 Ibid, p92 
311 Geoffrey Cocks, 1948. Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: the Göring Institute. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985. page 
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 Gustav Rau, a prominent name in the equestrian competition world at the time, took 
charge of German horse breeding. Eventually his operations included stud farms across Poland, 
the SS stables, and an experimental stable at Auschwitz.312  It was Rau who ended up driving 
the equine eugenics program geared towards breeding the perfect warhorse. In order to achieve 
this, the finest European horses were to be accumulated across Europe and the world. Rau 
eventually set his sights on the Polish Arabians and the Austrian Lipizzaners. 
Made famous by Walt Disney’s Miracle of the White Stallions and Elizabeth Lett’s The 
Perfect Horse, the Lipizzaner breed was almost lost due to Rau’s greed, as was the classical art 
of dressage. The director of the school at the time, Alois Podhajsky, concocted a plan to evacuate 
the stallions from Vienna to the town of St. Martins. There, the stallions were safe in the 
mountains until the advancing Soviet Army threatened the lives of the precious stallions. In a 
lucky coincidence, General Patton was near the town of St Martins and attended an exhibition to 
see the stallions. Learning of their fate, and the fate of the other captured horses, Patton initiated 
Operation Cowboy to liberate these white stallions, along with the breeding stock of mares, from 




312 Letts, Elizabeth. The Perfect Horse: The Daring U.S. Mission to Rescue the Priceless Stallions Kidnapped by the 
Nazis. (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 2017.) p 37 
313 For more, refer to Elizabeth Letts’ book, The Perfect Horse 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The disparity between the propagandic image versus reality of the Second World War 
reveals striking gaps within the common conception of the war, and furthermore the 
understanding as a whole of the German force specifically. The horse, with the role of cavalry 
mount and artillery pack horse, boasted a large and impactful role within the German Army 
during World War II. Further examination reveals a complex and varied performance, across all 
campaigns, even in the face of mechanized and modernized warfare. The ever-faithful servant, 
the horse, carried his rider across the French riverways and Russian tundra, pulled supply 
wagons, and towed metal artillery. As much as propaganda elevated the German Army to a 
seemingly formidable force composed of terrorizing Panzers and other steel machinery, the horse 
was the living and breathing heart literally behind much of the German Army’s movements. 
Almost 3 million recorded horses served under the German banner alone, pulling ambulances 
and field kitchens, to riding scouting missions and patrolling partisans. How many more have 
been lost to history may never be known.   
 The horse held a prominent position within the German ranks, and history has hidden 
them under a banner of steel and iron and fear. Whether in Polish soil or preparing to cross the 
English Channel, the horse was a part of the German Army and alas also fell victim to the path of 
destruction blazed by the events of war. Placed initially by the infamous Treaty of Versailles, the 
role of the horse continued to exist as the Nazis encountered shortcomings in their mad dash to 
modernization and world dominance. The use of the horse was not without difficulties, in that 
large amounts of resources were diverted to attend to the care and needs of the animals, from 
fodder taking up valuable train cars, or to the manpower behind the veterinary companies alone. 
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The end of cavalry, not just the German cavalry, was an inevitable result of a 
modernizing world and mechanizing warfare. As a testament to the warhorse, it is crucial to 
understand the sacrifice of the four-legged and consider a side of the war that has been relatively 
overlooked. However, the larger truth is that of the use of the horse remaining an integral part of 
the German army and understanding the complex nature of this utilization is critical to 
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Image 1. Training: Multiple horses and riders taking a jump. Adapted from Johnson, p31 
Johnson, Paul Louis. (2006). Horse of the German Army in World War II. Atglen, PA: Schiffer 
Military History. P31 
 
 
Image 2. Horses outfitted with the Sielengeschirr 25 breast harnesses. This harness was used 
when the horse was to be driven by the saddle. Adapted from Johnson, Paul Louis. (2006). Horse 
of the German Army in World War II. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. P131 
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Image 3. Two troopers with their mounts. Riders are wearing the M18 helmet. The curved bit is 
referred to as the “S” bit. Adapted from Johnson, Paul Louis. (2006). Horse of the German Army 
in World War II. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. P122 
 
 
Image 4. Horse-drawn wagons crowd together following combat at Andrezejewo, during the 
Polish campaign. Adapted from Johnson, Paul Louis. (2006). Horse of the German Army in 
World War II. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. P177 
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Image 5. Cavalry at the trot. Natural cover from trees was gladly taken advantage of. Adapted 
from Johnson, Paul Louis. (2006). Horse of the German Army in World War II. Atglen, PA: 
Schiffer Military History. P175 
 
 
Image 6. Example of a river crossing with horses. Unsaddled horses would swim alongside the 
boats, held by the troopers. In this manner, the horse could propel the boat across in the absence 
of ropes or oars. Adapted from Johnson, Paul Louis. (2006). Horse of the German Army in World 
War II. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. P169 
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Image 7. Rear-shot of cavalry. The rifle is slung across the back – a practice which was 
discontinued in 1941. The rear pack also contains the feed bag and the zeltbahn – which held 
grain or a blanket. Adapted from Johnson, Paul Louis. (2006). Horse of the German Army in 
World War II. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. P149 
 
 
Image 8. A mounted office in front of infantry. Adapted from Johnson, Paul Louis. (2006). 
Horse of the German Army in World War II. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. P143 






Image 9. A French road littered with the destruction of war – wagons and horses create a traffic 
jam for oncoming vehicles and infantry. Adapted from Garson, Paul (2018) Warhorses of 
Germany: The Myth of the mechanized Blitzkrieg. Gloucestershire:Amberley Publishing. P117 
 
 
Image 10. A trooper shoots a rifle on top of his horse. This training exercise tested the obedience 
of the horse, but also the confidence of the rider. Further vaulting exercises were incorporated 
into training, increasing the riders’ maneuverability and mobility in the saddle, not to mention 
confidence. This also helped the horse get used to movement in the saddle and worked to ‘de-
spook’ him. Adapted from Garson, Paul (2018) Warhorses of Germany: The Myth of the 
mechanized Blitzkrieg. Gloucestershire: Amberley Publishing. P58 
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Image 11. A horse with a curb bit, and a forage bag strap around the neck. During the Russian 
Campaign. Adapted from Richter, Klaus Christian (1995) Cavalry of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1945. 
Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. P150 
 
 
Image 12. A signals member laying telephone lines. Adapted from Richter, Klaus Christian 
(1995) Cavalry of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1945. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. P123 
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Image 13. A 1st machine gunner removing his IMG 34. Adapted from Richter, Klaus Christian 




Image 14. A likely dispatch rider crosses a river. Note the halter worn in addition to the bridle. 
Adapted from Richter, Klaus Christian (1995) Cavalry of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1945. Atglen, 
PA: Schiffer Military History. P56 
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Image 15. A rider with standard equipment before 1940. Note the S bit and the scabbard. 
Adapted from Richter, Klaus Christian (1995) Cavalry of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1945. Atglen, 




Image 16. A river crossing in which the horses joined their riders on the boat. This particular 
river crossing took place across the Pripet River in Poland. This is SS Cavalry Regiment I. 
Adapted from Johnson, Paul Louis. (2006). Horse of the German Army in World War II. Atglen, 
PA: Schiffer Military History. P273 
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Image 17. The Russian muddy season proved a challenge to even the strongest horses.  Adapted 
from Johnson, Paul Louis. (2006). Horse of the German Army in World War II. Atglen, PA: 
Schiffer Military History. P273 
 
 
Image 18. Everyone must take cover from enemy fire – even the horses. Adapted from Johnson, 
Paul Louis. (2006). Horse of the German Army in World War II. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military 
History. P329 
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Image 19. Horses could be moved via wagon or railcar. Measures such as these were 
implemented when the horses needed to be conserved, or speed and time was of the essence. 
This practice was also used to move injured horses. Adapted from Johnson, Paul Louis. (2006). 
Horse of the German Army in World War II. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. P320 
 
 
Image 20. Artillery horses being led away after delivering their guns. Adapted from Johnson, 
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Image 21. Riders conquering terrain otherwise difficult for vehicles. Adapted from Richter, 




Image 22. An example of horse artillery. Note all crew are mounted. Adapted from Richter, 
Klaus Christian (1995) Cavalry of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1945. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military 
History. P102 
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Image 23. An example of a sea loading in anticipation for Operation Sealion. Adapted from 
Piekałkiewicz, Janusz. The Cavalry of World War II. London: Orbis Books, 1979. P92 
 
 
Image 24. An ice-coated horse during the winter months in Russia. The photo is captioned noting 
a temperature of 45 degrees below zero. Adapted from Piekałkiewicz, Janusz. The Cavalry of 
World War II. London: Orbis Books, 1979. P171 
